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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Statement of ~ problem: Sinee Halthus, economists who 
have studied the problem of population have been concerned pri-
mirily with the danger of over-population. Indeed, with but few 
exceptions, the world witnessed a tremendous gro\~h of popula-
tion throughout t he nineteenth century. The population of Eng-
land and Wales increased from 8 million to 33 mill~on during 
the nineteenth cehtury, about fourfold in one hundred years and 
1 
an average m~ increase of about two millions in each decade. 
In the United States thE;) increase was: even greater. Total popu-
lation was about_ 5.3 million in 1800. It grew to 76 million in 
1900, an increase of 71 million in one hundred years or an 
2 
average increase of 7 million in each decade. Tbaa, even up to 
I 1923 Keynes, the first economist who later warned about the 
implications of declining population growth, still gave weight 
to the problem of over-population. By World War I, the relative 
rate of population growth in some western countries. bad already 
begun to fall. This drop, ho\vever, was;; not noticed partly be-
cause the annual increment. of population was still growing and 
partly because the economic expans.ion at that time was still in 
progress , and oversbadowed . minor retarding forceso. After 1925 
even the absolute rate of population gro\~h was dropped. Econo-
mists~, then, became aware of this trend but its danger was not 
1 W.B.Reddaway, The Economics Of' Declining Population 
Growth. London, 1939. p. 13. 
2 National Resourse Committee, The Problem of Changing 
Population. New York: 1938 Second Printing. p. 21.--
1 
realized until after the outbreak of the great depression. 
Keynes, at about the same time of publishing his famous general 
theory, first called attention to the serious economic conse-
quences of the decline of population grolvth and warned that the 
trend tmvard a stationary population was~: no less harmful than 
the trend of over-population. He said, 11 we have another devil 
3 
at our elbow at least a83 fierce as:: the I-1al thus ian ... 11 
4 
Perhaps it was his scepticism for long-run theory or 
the fact that he had not developed his thinking that explains 
why he did not integrate this population problem with his gene-
ral theory. This shortcoming of Keynes as well as the economic 
events of the 1930's, particularly the weak recovery of 1937, 
~ led to the development of Professor Hansen's theory of 
secular stagnation. From l9J8 on, Hansen began stressing the 
importance of enviromental factors in economic development, and 
tbis approachculminated in his presidential speech to the Amari 
can Economic Association in 1941. In this address, Hansen exp-
ressed what later became known as the stagnation theory or, as 
some economists called it, the theory of vanishing investment 
opportunities. Among the many important factors creating invest 
ment opportunities, he, like Keynes, emphasized the peculiar 
role of population growth. He said that population growth alone 
accounted for 60% of the total capital formation i~ the United 
States in the last half of the nineteenth century. Consequently 
3 J .M.Keynes, 11Some Economic Consequences of a Declining 
Population11 Eugenic Review. 1937. p. 16. 
4 He has been quoted as saying that in the long run we 
are all dead. 
2 
he felt that the tendency towards a stationary population would 
greatly handicap economic expansion. 
At the present time, there are still controversies over 
both the stagnation theory in general and the problem of declin 
ing population gro"Vrth in particular. In this paper the study is 
limited to the latter and the principle objective is to look 
into the various changes that follow from the decli~e of popu-
lation growth and to see. whether and how these changes would 
lead the economy into stagnation. Following this, the current 
controversies over the stagnation theory and the importance of 
declining population growth will be summarized. Before going 
into the problem, however, it is necasse.ry to see how., the stag-
nation theory is connected \'lith Keynes • general theory, and to 
examine certain demographical concepts that .are pertinent to 
the meaning of declining population growth. This will be done 
in the rest of the chapter. 
Consumption .function and theory of vanishing investment 
opportunities: The stagnation theory was rooted in Lord Keynes' 
General TheO£Y of Employment Interest and Money. In the General 
Theory, Keynes e~phasized more the short run analysis. This can 
5 
be seen from his rigid assumptions. Long run secular aspects 
\'Tere only occasionally refered to and fragmentarily treated un-
til later Prmfessor Hansen developed it into a unique doctrine. 
But, since the basic principle is still Keynesian it waa often 
called Keynes-Hansen stagnation theory. 
5 J.M.Keynes, General Theory£! Employment,Interest §E£ 
Money • New York & L~ndon. 1937. p. 245. . 
3 
Fundamental to the understanding of the Keynes short run 
employment theory is that, in a certain period, the total in-
come of the society is equal to the consumption expw.nditures 
plus the business expenditures, assuming a closed and private 
enterprise economy '\<Vhere the foreign balance and government 
expenditure are considered zero. The consumption expenditure, 
according to Keynes, is determined by the consumer•s income and 
by the proportion of the income spent or saved, which he called 
propensity to c~nsume and propensity to save, respectively. 
The business expenditure is determined by the interest rate 
and the marginal efficiency of capital l'Thich Keynes defined as 
the rate of discount l'n1ich would make the present value of the 
series of the annuities: given by the returns expected from the 
6 
capital assai: during its life just equal to its supply price. 
Clearly thteetwo constituents of the national income are govern 
ad by different motives. Yet, to keep the income flow, the part 
of the income saved has to be transfered to investment because 
saving itself is not a constituent of income. If the saving is 
completely absorbed into investment the income will be kept at 
a constant flow. If it falls short the national income and sav-
ing of the next period will be dropped until it keeps equili-
brium w-Tith the lower investment. \'!hen the prospect of business 
is good, investment may exceed saving and new money will be 
called for until full employment is reached. Keynes believed 
6 Ibid. ,p~ 135. 
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that the propensitp,- to consume and consequently the propensity 
to save are stable over a certain p eriod of time, but the mar-
ginal efficiency of capital, on which new investment is largely 
based, will be subject to fluctuat_ion because the long term 
expectations are inherently unstable. This idea constitutes 
his basic explanation of the trade cycle. 
With respect to the long run secular aspect, Keynes thou,1~ 
~~ the consumption function would be changed because the law 
governing the human consumptive behaviour is that the rate of 
increase of consumption is inversely proportional to the in-
crease of income. In other words, as the society becomes richer 
the relative amount of saving will become larger and larger. 
From the secular point of view, maintaining full employment 
would, thus, need larger investment; but, according to Keynes, 
secular trend is to have the capital asset~ in abundance and 
incentive to invest depressed. This contention is based upon 
the notion that the output of the ne\'1 capital asset '\'las conti-
nuously in competition with the output of the existing capital 
asset. It, however, may not be the case if , in the long run, 
we allow for the emergence of new demand for the outputs and 
capitals, old or new. This imperfection thus calls forth for 
furbher study and hence links up with Professor Hansen's theory 
of vanishing investment opportunities to become the stagnation 
theory. 
Hansen, instead of analyzing the factors: \-vbich determine 
the long term expectation of the business, looked to the factor 
5 
that ultimately determine .the total volume of investment of the 
society. He found that the tremendous increase of p opulation, 
the continuous technological revolution and t he discovery of 
new land in the past century constituted the main reason why 
capital assets were kept scarce despite their continuous accu-
mulation. He also found that, at the time when the society was 
concerned with over-saving, all of the above stimulating factor 
for investment had gegun to lo~se their vigor. Therefore, the 
future of the free enterprise economy was likely to be a state 
of stagnation where the amount of saving would tend to be 
larger and larger and the investment opportunities smaller and 
smaller. Society, the~ , would be characterized by a secular 
declin8 of the marginal efficiency of capital and a secular in-
crease of saving. Business recoveries would be weak and anemic 
and the depressions would be deepened and prolonged. 
This, briefly is the stagnation theory. It is, in essenc , 
the combination of Keynes• psychological law and Hansen's 
theory of vanishing investment opportunities. It is different 
from the traditional concept of the stationary state and euen 
from the so-called mature economy in that·.it does not mean zero 
net capital formation and full employment. It means, instead, 
a long- run under emploment fluctuation. 
Trend £1 population: Before studying the economic conse-
quences of declining population growth we should first examine 
the concept and see what it implies. Declining population grow-
th does not simply mean a temporary change of total population 
6 
as in the case of sudden large decrea ses in immigration or of 
sudden emmigration. It is a steady and continuous- social pheno-
menon. At the present time, there is little discussion of the 
law of population; population studies~ now begin with the fact 
that the size of the population of one generation is always 
determined by the size of the preceding generation and in view 
of certain social and economic changes , a trend of increase 
or decrease is, of course, possible. 
The past record of declining population does not consti-
tute the only basis_. for the prediction or judgement of a declin. 
ingtrend. To predict such a trend we must,first, have some accu 
rate measurement of birth and death rates and of net interna-
tional migration, and, second, have some understanding of the 
factors that determine the birth and death rates and interna- I 
tional migration that might lead to declining population trends 
Broadly, there are three determinants upon which the 
future population depends: 
1. The birth ~. fertiliti ~ and specific fertiliti 
~· The birth rate means the number of births per 1,000 of 
the population. This rate is a "crudeu rate because only women 
at their child bearing age can bear children. The average numbe ~ 
of births per 1,000 women 20-44 years of age is called the fer-
tility rate. Clearly, the larger the fertility rate the larger 
will be the size of the future population and vice versa. This 
"refined" rate, still is not very accurate for the prediction 
of the future population because the fertility is so different 
within the age group 20-44. A more accurate trend must be 
7 
sought from the use of the specific fertility rate which is cali 
culated by subdividing the age group of 20-44 into 5 year inter l 
vals and measures their fertility r ate separately. 
2. The death rate and ~ mortality ~. The death rate 
means the number of deaths per 1,000 of the population. Since 
the death rate is high at both extremities, infant and aged, 
and low in the middle age bracket, the demographers always use 
the mortality rate which registers the number of death per 1,00 1 
at different ages. The higher the mortality rate, the smaller 
will be the future population. More important, however, is the 
fact that if the mortality rate of female under 44 is high, the 
decline of population in the future will be more serious than 
if the rate is high in the age above 44. This point is very 
important in the determination of the net reproduction rate. 
3. Immigration and emmigration. Immigration will increas 
the size of the population of a nation and emmigration will 
decrease it. The age composition of both the immigrants and 
the emmigrants usually center in the middle-age group. Migratio 
can easily be brought under control by the government and there 
fo.re is not as important as the other two in the determination 
of future population. 
Another manner in which the important relationships 
between births and .death: may be analyzed with greater precision 
is by use of gross and net reproduction rates. The gross re-
production rate is the number of female babies born per 1,000 
women for the age group between 20-44. The mortality rate of 
8 
the female babies can not be ignored ho\tlever. Therefore the 
ratio of the number of female babies that survive to child 
bearing ages would give us the net. reproduction rate. If the 
net reproduction rate is below one, the population will decline 
because the number of girls who reach childbearing ages in the 
next generation will be smaller than tba tin the present lbne. 
ThEnet reproduction rate can be fur~er refined by calculating 
the rates separately for smaller age groups between 20-44. 
The factors affecting the mortality rate are mainly 
war, medical science and general sanitary conditions. During 
the past hundred years -this rate had been greatly reduced in 
most western countrieso and, at present, the trend is to\'Tard a 
7 
still lo'\tTer rate. This decrease of mortality rate constitutes 
the main reason for the increase of population in the past and 
is the reason why the proportion of the aged people became 
larger in the \·lest em society. 
The factorsothat govern the birth or fertility rate are 
numerous: birth control, urbanization, housing facilities and 
the business cycle. The most impo1~ant cause, however, accord-
ing to the study of the Bureau of tl::te Census, is the "wide 
apread and effective attempts to limit family to the numbers 
of children vianted" which" alone had reduced the gross reproda.c I 
tion rate to leas than one third of what it othe~~ise would 
7 S.E.Harris, 11What to do 1tlith 18 f.Ullion Aged". The 
New York I.!!lli! Magazine, July 10, 1949. 11 In 1849, cho1eraooused 
5,017 deaths in New York City and thUS' wiped ten out of every 1 
1,000 inhabitants_.,. Cut:rently, deaths due to all causes amount.-_ t 
about ten deaths per 1,000 of the population. 11 
9 
have been. " 
The factora:.that determine the rise and fall of immigra-
tion and emmigration are also very complicated, Aside from the 
difference of economic opportunities between any two nations! , 
there are also political and social motives · which may affect 
the international 1nigration. In a new country like the United 
States, immigration bas been very important, but during the 
inter-war period, restriction of immigration became prevalent 
and the result w-as 11a marked contraction not only 1n the vol'Uume 
of immigration, b~t also in the choice open to the individual 
9 
immigrant." 
In forecasting the future population, we should assume 
a fertility rate, a mortality rate and a trend af net interna-
tional migration. These assumptions, of course, must be based 
upon the judgements of the trend of the factorathat have been 
mentioned above. ( Usually three different assumptions~-low, 
medium and high--are made for each of the determinant.) In the 
United St~tes, since the net reprodQction rate has been conti-
10 
nually below one s:ince 1930 and the trend of immigration was 
falling, the demographers in the last ten years, baa invariably 
assumed a low fertility rate and a small annual net interna-
tional migration. On these assumptions they predicted that, 
after the year 2,000, the United States would have a stationary 
8 Bureau of theCensus, Forecast of the Population of the 
United States. Washington D. c., 1947. _p. 25. 
9 Julius Issac, Economics of Migration, New York. Oaford 
University press. 1947. p. 23. 
10 Ibid. , p. 86 • 
10 
• 
population. This prediction, as understood, has its root on the 
belief that birth control will be continuously prevailing for 
an indefinite period of time. Whether or not this belief is as 
unfounded as the Malthus 1 geometric rate of multiplication is 
beyond the scope of the present study, but in view of the recen 
upsurge in the birth rate, it is justifiable for us to take a 
cautious attitude. Ferhaps:: this upsurge is a temporary pheno-
menon caused by the second World War. Yet it is large enough 
to disturb the declining trend commencing 1n 1925, and to prove 
wrong many forecasts made in the last ten years. 
What have been discussed above are demographical concepts 
To study the economic consequences of the declining population 
growth certain other implications have to be noted. 
A decline of population gro~~h may mean a decline of 
either the relative rate of growth or the absolute amount of 
grm>Tth. The relative rate of population grovrth in the United 
States began to decline after 1870. Before 1860 the rate \'las_ 
always above 30 per cent(decennial). In 1860 the rate was 35.4. 
11 
It dropped to 26.7 in 1870 and continued to drop. The change 
in t he absolute amount of growth was conclusively a phenomenon 
after 1925. In July 1925 the annual increase reached 1,840,000 
while 1n 1930 it dropped to 1,462,000 and in 1935 it fell to 
12 
852,000. As it is the annual increment that makes up the new 
increment of demand, it seems better to use the latter as our 
11 National Resourees~ Committee, op. cit., p. 21. 
12 Bureau of the Census} op.cit.,p. 39. 
11 
standard of analpsis. 
Taking for granted that we know the changes in annual 
invrement of grovlth, vie will not uncover fully its economic 
effects anless we knol'r, at the same time, the change in age 
composition. 
Conventionally, the age composition is composed of 
three groups. First, is the young persons group, ages 1 to 20, 
which includes all of the young dependanta. Second is the adult 
group '\vhich includes mostly people of the working ages, ranging 
from 20 to 65, and third is the old-aged group composed largely 
of the pensioners, aged 65 and above. 
The decrease in the mobtality rate will affect all ages. 
According to the study of the Bureau of the Census, the percen-
tage decrease was and will be higher in the age group 15-34 and 
will become lower and lower after the age of 65. Under these 
conditions, the increase in the old age group is inevitable. 
In 1850 the old aged group constituted only 2.6% of the popula-
tion--about o.6 millions. It will reach 11.3 million or 7.7% in 
- 13 
1950 and will enentually attain 18 million in 1975. The middle 
aged group will become larger because of the decreGsing mortali-
ty rate; but, since this means more will live to an old age 
the result will be to have the middle-age group grow at a slow-
er pace, raising the median age of the population and add more 
to the old-age group. Certainly it will also help to enlarge 
the number of the infants- but, as we shall see, this group is 
13 S.E.Harris, ££.£!1., p. 42. 
12 
,e 
largely affected by the fertility r ate. 
The decrease in the fertility rate, of course, affects 
mainly the young age gr oup and especially the number of infants 
The study of the Bureau of the Census shows that, in the United 
States, the number of children under 5 years of a ge constituted 
15.1% of the enumerated population in 1850. In 1900 it dropped 
tm 12.1% and was 8% in 1940. With median assumption of the fer-
tility and mortality rate, it was predicted that the percentage 
will fall to 6.8% in 1975. The children of ages from 15 to 19 
dropped slowly. It was about 40% in 1800 and 24% in 1945. The 
14 
figure will be around 19-23% in 1975. 
In the case of international migration the effect on 
age-composition will most likely be the increase in the middle 
age group. For both mental and physical reasons, the aged a re 
not likely adventurous. The infant group also may not be very 
large because a lart e family is difficult to move. If the pre-
sent trend of low immigration continuea, the middle age group 
will be smaller than it otherwise ·would be. 
Having now make clear what we really meant about the 
trend of declining population grouth we s hall noV'l proceed to 
make a comparison of this trend with the general economic 
picture. This comparison serves as a preliminary step to the 
main study. 
A~ pointed out before, during the n'neteenth century, 
14. Bureau of the Census, £2.£11., p. 50. 
13 
the population of all the western countries was invreasing by 
1 leaps. and bounds! In the United States, not only the total 
population increased fifteenfold but also the median age of the 
population increased from 16 in 1800\1 to 23 in 1900 and 29.7 in 
15 
1945. Concurrent with the population growth in the nineteenth 
century, the economic progress was also large. Professor Hansen 
estimated that the average annual increase of the physicali out-
puts in Western Europe and the United States was 3~ and 4%. A 
little lass than half of the 3% increase in Western Europa and 
more than half of the 4% in the United Statea was attributed to 
the population growth(per capita increase in. ·real income are 
one and 1 1/2% per annum in Western Europe and the United States~. 
Capital formation had progressed at about the same rate as the 
rise in aggregate outputs. He concluded that" the growth of po-
pulation in the last half of the nineteenth century was respon-
s~ble for about 40% of the total volume of capital formation in 
Western Europe and 60% of the total capital formation in the 
16 
United States~' 
15 S.E.Harris, ~.£11., p. 50. 
16 A.H. Hansen, Economic Progress and Declining Popula-
tion." Amerivan Economic Review May 1939. p. 4. 
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II CHAPTER 11. THE EFFECTS OF DECLINING POPULATION GROWTH lJPON 
I' CONSU1:•1PTION AND SAVING. 
I
I 
1
1 The population-effect. The change in the absolute rate 
of population growth is not mniform. ~o study its economic 
effects, we have to take account of the change in age composi-
1 
li tion that follows from it. As we have seen, in the determina-
1 
tion of population trend, the international migration and the 
increase of the old-aged group are comparatively unimportant. 
I 
11 Therefore, we shall begin our analysis from the change of the 
I young aged group. Birth rate is not an adequate unit for study. 
I 
In the following, we s hall use family size to take its place. 
1 It is assumed that the larger t he young aged group the larger 
t he f amily. 
The complete information of the f amily siae in the Unite 
States was made only from 1943 by the Bureau of the Census. 
According to its study, during the years 1910-1940, among the 
I white women aged 45-49( nearly all of them had had their famili ) 
the proportion that had borne five or more children fell almost 
1 48%, the proportion with no children ar with one or two jumped 
I 1 
I over 52%. 
I Now, by using the information of the family size, we can 
I 
1 analyze the economic effects of t he decrea sing birth rate by 
I studying the family budgets of the different sizes within the 
1 same income group. This separation of population effects f rom 
I 
1 Bureau of the Census, £2.£11.,p. 19. 
15 
i 
income effects is made because these two effects are completely II 
different in natura. When one's income is increased, he will not11 
increase his spendings on the daily necessities proportionally. I 
Jl In most cases, he will spend on things that were considered as 
l 1111xurias before his income was increased or add this increased 
income to bis savings, wholly or partly. Thus the higher the 
income the larger will be the saving and the consumption will, 
most likely, be directed to goods and services thB.t be.va a 
higher elasticity of demand. The population change, however, I 
will show different results. Without any cr~nge in tncome, a 
family of two will find their per-capita income drops one half I 
II 
I' 
when his family is doubled in size. He must feed his children 
at the expense of his own account. Besides, he will cut his 
expenditures on luxuries first and, if not or not enough, he 
must draw on his saving ( either reduce his conventional saving l 
or elsa dissave). Therefore, the economic effects of increasing ! 
(or decreasing) population is just the opposite to the effects 
of increasing or decreasing income. One increases the expendi-
tures on luxuries and increases saving, the other increases 
the expenditures on nece ssities and decrease savings. If the 
condition were t~~t of a decreasing population and increasing 
income(or increasing population and decreasing income) the 
effect will be the total of the two. 
P~alysis of household budget. Every budget, even of the 
smallest family, consists of a large number of consumers goods 
and services. The number and nature of these depend on the size 
16 
II 
as \'Tell as on income and taste. By comparing the budgets of 
1 different family sizes within the same income group the income 
effect will be eliminated, and by taking a broader classifica-
tion of the various- expenditures, the complication of taste 
I difference will also be insignificant. Since 1935 many studie~ 
of household consumptions have been made, but their classifica-
tion ha s been too much in detail. For the present purpose of 
showing the main shift through the population change the expen-
ditures are regrouped into food, housing, clothing, miscellaneot ~ 
and saving. The first three items are considered as necessities 
and the miscellaneous item will be taken to represent non-nece 
ssities or luxuries. 
Below is a table made from the "Family Expenditures in 
Seven New England Cities" by the Bureau of the Labor Statistics 
for 1935-1936. 
17 
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II II 
I
I Table 1. 1 
Family Expenditure by Income and by Siz.e of Family 
of Seven New England Citiea(l935-1936) 
Items 
of $1,000-1,249 
-r~ 
Expenditure Family Type 
1 11& lV& 
111 v 
Food 30. 9 37. 6 40. 9 
Income Class 
$2' 250-2' 1~99 
Family Type 
1 11& lV& 
111 v 
29.2 30.8 32.0 
1 
$4,000-4,999 
Family Type 
11& lV& 
111 v 
21.0 21.0 25.8 
Housing 
~~ clothing 
11 Miscellaneous 
II Saving 
35.2 34.4 34.8 
7.4 7.8 7.4 
24.9 20.2 18.8 
32.4 33.2 29.2 32.2 24.3 24.4 
8.9 9.9 13.2 11.2 11.7 11.3 
28.4 25.5 25.6 35.6 42.9 38.5 
II 
IJ Sourse: 
-64 -49 -111 293 190 61 1,394 110 610 J 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Departmen 1 
of Labor. Famil~ Expenditure In Seven New England 
Cities 1935-193 • Bulletin No. 645 Vol. 11. 
~~ 1. no children and others(family of two) 
11. 1 child under 16(family of three) 
111. 2 children under 16(family of four) 
lV. 1 cb~ld 16 or over and one or no other person 
regardless of age(family of 3 or 4) 
V. 1 child under 16, one person 16 or over, and 
one or two others regardless of age(family of 
5 or 6). 
'I 'I I 
I l ~- 19 
From the above table we see that: 
1. The larger the size of the family the greater the 
II percentage expenditures on food >Tithin any income group and the 
1
1 
I higher the income the less is spent. on food. The increa se is II 
I about 33% and 24% in the ihcome level of $1,000-$1,249 and I 
1 ~4,000-$4,999 respectively when the sixe of the family is doublJd. 
2. The relation between the housing expenditure and the 
I family size is not very distinct. 1'here is an inverse relation 
between the family size and the housing expenditure within any 
income group and the higher income group spent a slightly small 
er percentage of income on housing. The study of Allen and 
Lorimer for Chicago shows the same result. They did not make 
any specific explanations, but in the study of urban worker's 
I " 1 family expenditures Allen said, the pressure of housing need 
II . 2 
li is very marked for the large families. 11 This phenomenon has 
II 
i been used by some economists to argue against Hansen's theory 
I to which vie s hall discuss later. Here one point should be noted 
i 
and tl1at is the •husband and wife' family is, in many cases, an 
established family. Their children had left them. Consequently, 
their houses are big and the expenditures on maintenance and 
household operation have to be larger. Also, the families of z 
I I one or two(even 3) children are mostly new families. As many 
I 
J children can live in the same room, their housing expenditures 
I 
i do not necessarily rise in propQrtion to the number of ch ildren. 
II 1 1 -----:::2--:::R:-.";::'G-.-=D:-.-:::-A'::"l':;"l_e_n-,-;:F:-a-m"':"i~l-y Expenditures , ~ Study of its Varia-
1 
\J tions, ·· London 1935. p. 192. 
il 
·I 
II 
II 
- li The demand f or a new house( small) and the demand for a bigger 
house is different. P.ansen did not separate these two but it 
seems that he emphasize the former than the latter. 
3. There is a slightly increase in clothing expenditure 
when the family is bigger. Probably this is because t here are 
I 
II 
ja lot of methods to economize. For instance, the clothes of tbe I' 
I 
I first child may be used by the second child. 
I 4. Tn the lower and middle income group the larger the 
/ size of the f amily the less the expenditures on miscellaneous 
,l i terns. This relation does not exist in the upper income level. 
1 The reason is probably due to their ability to maintain it by 
reducing their savings slightly. 
5. The expenditures made on food, housing and clothing 
accounted for about four fifths of the budget of the 10\ver in-
I 
· come family and less than three fifths in the upper income level 
I The inerease in this combined expenditure is proportional to the 
· size of the family. The increase is from 73.5% to 82.9% in the 
lower income group when its size is doubled. 
1 6. The larger the size of the family the less is the 
tl 
ll ammunt of saving. This is true for all income levels except it 
l is dissaving in the lo"trer income level. The percentage reductio 
of the amount of saving is higher in the middle inc ome group 
I than in the lower and higher inc ome group. 
I 
• I Alll these seems to justify the notion that the increase 
(decrease) in the size of the family will increase(decreaseO 
I 
/; the expenditures of the necessities and redace(increase) the 
,, 
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amount of saving or either the poor or the rich. 
Beside these effects that are found from the family 
budget analysis, there are, hovrever, some other factors which 
are associated with the decrease in the birth rate that can not 
be seen from the budget. 
First, the decline of birth will conceivably reduce the 
enrollment in the elementary schools. Professor Sweezy estimated 
that the elementary school enrollment in 1930 had dropped to thJ/ 
3 I 
1920 level. From the economic point of view this drop 'i'Till 
affect the construction of the school building. 
Second, when the birth rate is falling, it will eventual , 
ly affect the number of people who attend the age of marriage 
which, in turn, will affect the demand for housing, furniture, 
wedding rings etc. because only when people get married will 
they leave their parental roof and seek a new home. Accoeding 
to the study of the Bureau of the Census, although the number 
of families will ccbntinuously increase from 1940 to 1960, the 
rate of increase will show a dovnaward movement. Whether this 
dovmward movement will affect the housing industry is, so far, 
a controversial problem. The Mational Resouces Committee, by 
comparing the index of marriage(l918-1935) ''~ith the urban resi-
dential construction series, concluded that the index of urban 
residential construction moves quite independant of the trend 
of marriage in the total population. But, as Morgan had rightly 
Paul S'\veezy, "Population Growth and Investment Opportu-
nities'' , Quarterly J ournal of Economics. November 1940. p. 66. 
21 
pointed out,"more accurately an increased number of families is 
4 
closely related with a demand for more housipg"and we shall see 
later that marriage rate is not a good unit for study. Unfortu-
nately, Morgan did not proceed on to study the relation between 
residential construction and the number of families, but, in-
stead shifted his emphasis on the larger housing expenditures 
of the small families. 
With respect to t he general construction, the attentions 
paid b y the leading economists are not great enough. For 1natanc : 
I Kuznet said, "the coincidence between the swings in the rate of 
I change in construction and those in population--- is thus a 
definite suggestion that changes in the rate of gro~nh of con-
struction, presumably through the influence of the former pri-
mirily on residential construction and types closely related to 
5 
it." This means that· the relation bet~rieen the population change 
a~d the general construction is an indirect one. 
Thirdly, public utilities, ~s its name implies, depends 
on the quantitative meaning of the'public! Roads, water supply, 
light and heating ~ystam will not expand if the 'public' is not 
large enoughto warrant its economic use. 
So much for t he economic effects of the change in the 
family size. Next, we shall see what will be the economic effect 
of the change in the old age and adult age group. 
4 Theodore £Vlorgan, Income and Em_p_loymeht. New York, 
Prentice Hall, Inc. 1947. p.l60. 
5 Simon Kuznet, National Income,~ SQ~arx _ of Findings 
Natioanl Bureau of Economic Research, New York. 194b. p.70. 
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Declini ng population growth and the change of consma2tio 
I and saving: The old-aged people will demand(as Keynes warned) 
I more luxuries and personal services which require less capital 
I
I to provide. The word luxuries had been questioned by many eco-
j nomists because the luxury spending is primirily a function of 
I 
1 income. One can not afford luxuries, no matter ho\1 old he is, 
if his income is at a low level. Some economists use the terms 
I 
I personal achievements and recreation instead of luxuries. But I· 
l'j clearly it is not the typical demand of the aged. We s hall not \I 
I enquire too much on the matter of definition but for later ~~ 
1
1 axposi tion 1•1a a ball define luxuries as any goode or service I 
vthich requires more labor per unit product. In this sense, the I 
,I 
I demand for personal services is certainly luxurious and some of li 
11 the characteristic demands of the omd lil<~e medical services and 11 
tl arts collection are also luxurious(especially those in the highj 
II 
i er income group)'. 
I 
I Some consumption goods like canes, toupees, hearing aida 1 
II conservative stout suits, will be more increasingly demanded 1 
1
1
1
1 • 1· than children s equipments such as bicycles aport goods etc. 
i Just how t hese changes of demand will affect the national econo II 
r my is difficult to say, but it is conceivable t hat the economic 
I system can ea sily adopt ._ to it. 
I. 
I The increase of the small family and the increase of the j 
It aged people will reduce the demand for the detached house and 
'I I increase the demand for apartments. As people get older they 
~bla to do the additional work usually entailed by the 
= T 
I 
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e. 
I 
extra rooms and the independant heating system of a house. A 
I 
II service:~a~n::::.:P::i:~a:::::r::o:u:; :::P::~-aged people I, 
will increase the burden of the society because when they retire,! 
they consume without producing. ThiS kind of dependancy is not J~­
self a serious problem because this will be counter balanced by ' 
small apartment in a building with restaurant and cleaning 
a decrease in the rationof children and youth to the working 
I 
' people. It is important, hov;ever, the way these old-aged are 
supported. The support of the old is nO\'l, partly at least, a 
lj 
\I 
I social problem. Harris estimated that if each citizen 65 and ovdr 
! 
would receive ~1,000 in goods and services yearly, then the cos1i 
to the nation of an adequate program for the old should be 11 I 
million dollars annually today and about 18 million by 1975 and 
II 6 
I, 21 million by 2,000. This is a 'should be' cost which is far 
I ' 
I more than the present rate but, according to Harris, the ten-
1 aency bB.s been to increase especially when the old voters are 
increased in number. 
The increase in the old-aged people will probably in-
crease the saving. It is usually conceived that the increase 
in saving by the smal l family may be counter balanced by the 
7 
decrease of saving in the old-aged group. But, it also should 
be noted that so long as the old people must have support or 
savings to dissave and people now have more c1wnces to live 
6 ~.E. Harris, Q£.ci~~·P· 30. 
7 Theodore Norgan, .QJ2.cit., p.l67. 
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The economic effects of the decrease in the adult group 
I I was usually analyzed from a different angle. Since their role 
11 as producers is considered more i mportant and the percentage 
I 4ecline of its growth is not large, the effect of this change 
I on consumption and saving has been completely neglected. In fac , 
1 the consumption and saving of the infants and the old-aged grouJ 
are all coming from this group. Large families compel them to 
spend more on necessities, until, at about the age 40-45, they 
1 are released from their burden and then begin to accumulate 
savings for their retired life. The nature of their own consump, i 
II 
tiona are, of course, different from the child and the old-aged I 
but whether or not they tend to spend more on necessities or on I 
luxuries can not be said a priori. In general, those who a re 
under 40-45 and have a l a rge family, tend to spend more on 
necessities than those who are over 45(or else ·: under 45 with 
a small family) do not need to worry about their retired life, 
~ tend to spend more on luxuries. 
I. 
II 
ll 
The i mmigrants, as they are mostly in the adult age 
and also in the lower income strata, tend to spend more on 
grou~ 
nece ll 
25 
l 
ssities. The degree of which certainly depends on their respec-
.L 
I ti ve family size and income. 
Another factor involved in the consumption habit of this 
group is the female~s spending. As we know, this group is the 
largest one in the total population but half of them are femaleE. 
In most societies they are not income producing. They are as 
dependant as the young and t he old. The demand for luxuries and 
fashionable goods::- seems to come largely from tlm women between 
20 and 50 years of age in the higher and middle income group. 
The slow decline in this particular group and the large increa se 
in the old aged group may aggravate the economic difficulties::. 
which Keynes has emphasized. 
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CHAPTER III. SO~lli INTANGIBLE EFFECTS OF DECLINING POPULA• 
TION GROWTH 
Expectation, Ri§k and Uncertaint~: All the factors 
considered above are tangible and to a certain degree sub-
ject to measurement. It was analyzed solely from the demand 
side by assuming that, since every man in the total popula-
tion is a consumer, a change in its number or its habits 
will correspondingly change the quantity and nature of the 
demand of the society. It was clearly a one-sided picture. 
Part of the people in the total population are at 
the same time producers, in the sense that they produce 
goods and services for the consumption of the whole popula-
tion. The size, quality, skill and effort of these people 
finally determine what and how much a society can produce 
in a given period. Besides, demand alone can not determine 
the economic activity. The way the entrepreneurs meet, 
create, and judge the demand is sometimes even more important 
than the demand itself in shaping the economy and it ·is one 
of the reasons why management is separated from labor as an 
independent factor of production. We shall see that this 
factor will also be affected by the decline in population 
grov..rth. 
In the following, we shall first review Keynes' 
analysis of business behaviour in face of declining popula-
tion grov.~h, and then indicate the probable change in the 
productivity of the labor force. 
2 2 
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Keynes assumes that the basic motive of doing business 
is to make profit. So, investment occurs when the rna rgin al 
efficiency of capital is greater than the interest rate. 
Since the interest rate is governed largely by the institu-
tional factors and will not fluctuate very much, the most 
determining factor for profit is then, the marginal effi-
ciency of capital, which, as indicated before, was based 
upon the prospective yields. The prospective yield, as its 
name implies, is based on expectations which are highly 
unstable in so far as the business society is characterized 
by uncertainty and risk. 1 This is particularly important 
for the long run investment because the longer the time the 
more difficult it is to make a prediction. 
According to Keynes, rapid population growth can 
reduce the risk of investment. 'I'he reason is that "business 
expectation being based more on present than on the pro-
spective demand, an era of increasing population tends to 
exceed what was hoped for' and "moreover a mistake in 
temporary over supply of capital -- will in such conditions 
2 
rapidly be corrected." This contention was generally agreed 
1 F. H. Knight, ~' Uncertainty and Profit {New 
York, 1921). He defined risk as a "measurable uncertainty 
which can by any method be reduced to an objective quantita-
tive determinate probability" and defined uncertainty as "a 
higher form of uncertainty not susceptible to measurement 
and hence to limitation." According to him this distinction 
of uncertainty "is the basis of a valid theory of profit." 
Pp. 20, 31. 
2 J. M. Keynes; QQ. cit., p. 16. 
I upon and Burns found out that the expectation of the growth 
I of a city usually caused over-building which would be wasted 
!
11 
. if population growth was not followed) 
Theelement of uncertainty involved in the decline of 
population growth raised by Keynes is the tendency of large 
spending on fashionable goods which are subject to style 
changes. This factor was expressed more fully by the later 
writers. For instance, Nourse said, " -- catering to a 
rise in the standard of living involves many more risks and 
uncertainties than extending existing industries to provide 
for more consumers." This idea was also shared by Reddaway 
who, in his book Economics of Peclinin~ Population, said: 
Demand is more fickle as between one semi-luxury and 
if there is a slump this type of industry will suffer 
the greatest fall in demand. Semi-luxury goods require 
an elaborate sales organization and especially at the 
start, a costly advertising campaign which is liable to 
provoke a rival campaign by other producers whose market 
is threatened. All this makes the undertaking of capital 
outlay designed to cater for a rising standard of con-
sumption a highly risky proposition. The would be entre-
preneur may be able to calculate his cost of production 
for any level of output with fair accuracy; but the ques-
tion of the price, if any, at which he could sell that 
output, and the expense involved in doing so, is one 
about which he can know very little. And he will still 
be more in the dark as to whether he will continue to 
secure satisfactory results for a long enough time to 
justify his outlay of capital.4 
Thus, the decline in population growth wi 11 change 
demand more frequently than usual and make the businessman 
3 A. F. Burns, Measuring Business Cycle, p. 201. 
4 W. B. Reddaway, The Economics of Declinin~ 
Po2ulation (London, 1937), p. 107. 
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more cautious in investment. This kind of shifting demand is 
sometimes separate from the innovation process because inno-
vation is initiated by the producers rather than by the con-
sumers. It is contended that busine .ss may create new demand 
as well as make an adjustment in the change of demand. In 
the former case the businessmen really create troubles for 
themselves. However, even considering that, the increase of 
population may stimulate its creation and, at the same time, 
make its chance of success great. 
AdaPtation: If the shifting of demand causes 
trouble to business, a remedy can be found from the shifting 
of supply. In other words, we may try to increase the 
adaptibili ty of the business. This had been a oroblem in the 
case of structural unemployment. Unfortunately, it was 
found that the decline in population growth also made the 
adaptation difficult. 
First, the increased proportion of older people means 
that more would tend to be conservative. They are not willing, 
and even not capable, to change their jobs. The only hope-
ful effect is the increase in the retired workers which would 
make the depressed industries easy to retire. But this 
effect should not be exaggerated. 
Second, the undifferentiated young workers will be 
\ diminished. It is easier for a young man to change his job 
II than an older man and it is easier to train him for a new II 
I 
I 
job. Besides, he will accept a junior wage in either the 
0 
1: 
I 
I 
i 
II 
I 
I 
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I 
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declined or the newly developed industries. 
Thus, combining the problem of risk and the problem 
of adaptation, we find that the declining population growth 
will call forth the adjustments among the various industries, 1 
and, at the same time, makes the adj ustment difficult. 
f.roductivity and Efficiency:: The discussion of the 
relationship between population growth and productivity 
has had a long history. In the following, we shall resolve 
this problem into two parts because some terms are easily 
confused. 
The first part is the relation between population 
and the inventiveness of the people. Inventiveness does 
not mean skillful or dexterous. The former means creation 
while the latter means better utiliza tion. 
According to Spen&lar there is a correlation between 
the population growth and the inventive power. Harris re- 1! 
cently also found from history a lot of evidence to prove 
that the inventive genius was primarily the property of the 
young . He also brought up the di scovery of modern psychology 
that the mental activity reaches the peak at twenty to justi-
fy his findings.5 This contention, even can be support ed 
with historical facts and psychologi~al principle, still 
does not seem convincing because we can easily find out the 
old inventors. Professor Schumpeter, by taking China and 
5 s. E. Harris, 2£· cit., p. 50. 
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===============================l 3~2=== ====____.!_ E-! ever, as examples, had denied this kind of correlation. ~ his comparison, in fact, means the quality of popula- I 
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tion is more important than the quantity of population which 
is also controversial. Some historians had believed that 
the liberation of thought from political and religious oppres-
1
1 
sion and the geographical and climatical environment were I' 
the main reason for the early discoveries and inventions. 
In that case, in vent ion might be forthcoming in China and 
India once their thought is liberated. Since the historical 
development is different, static comparison can only reveal 
a partial truth. Besides, we are interested in the growth, 
not the size of the population, so if comparison is to be 
made, the case of Germany and France will be better and 
the evidence is, at least superficially, that rapid increase 
in population goes hand in hand with technological progress. 
In all, any comparison is deemed to be imperfect; what we 
can believe is that, other thing s being equal, the more the 
people work together the more likely they can solve the 
mysterious problem. 
The second part is the relation between population 
growth 8nd the skill and efficiency. Adam Smith believed 
that the increase in population will increase the market 
which, in turn, will stimulate exchange. People Who 
specialize in the production of the things for exchange will, 
due to the concentration of mind and energy, increase their 
I 
r 
I 
'I 
I
I 
dexterity and therefore increase their productivity. 6 Bastiat I 
held that the density of population permits us to improve 11 
h hi d · . t 7 Th . 1· . . t e mac nery an 1ncrease 1 s power. e 1mp 1cat1on 1n-
volved in these theories was that the increase in population 
expands the market and, therefore, calls forth the division 
of labor and the use of the method of mass production. There 
has been little doubt about the contention that division of 
labor will improve the skill and dexterity, but the question 
of the relation between efficiency and the scale of produc-
tion needs some consideration. 
Recent investigation of the efficiency of the dif-
ferent size of productive units revealed that the largest 
size is not necessarily the most efficient. From the 
regional or professional specialization viewpoint, the limit 
is more apparent. A doctor serving thirty patients a day may 
be much less efficient than serving ten patients. A large 
department store may have a lower labor cost per dollar of 
goods sold than the town's small shop but the total cost may 
\ not be lower because of increasing cost of other factors, 
I 
II 
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particularly location or site. In all, efficiency is not 
strictly proportional to the market • There is an optimum 
point which is different in different fields. 
With respect to the efficiency of the working people, 
the effect of declining population growth will be unfavorable 
6 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776), chapter I, 
Bk. 1. 
7 Frederic Bastiat, H~t~Qnies, Part 1. 
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because the average age of the working people will be high 
and the efficiency of the old workers was considered lower 
than the young workers. It has been estimated that the gain-
fully employed over 45 years of age increased from 26.1 per 
cent in 1910 to 32.7 per cent in l9JO, a rise of 6.6 per cent. 
In 1945 there were about 53 persons aged 45-64 per 100 aged 
20-44; by 1975 the ratio probably will be between 65-69 per 
100. 8 
Bureau of the Census, Q£• cit., p. 70. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE EFFECTS OF DECLINING POPULATION GROWTH ON 
CAPITAL FORrvlATION AND UNEJ.VIPLOYiviENT 
Having examined the meaning of secular stagnation 
and the probable effects of the declining population growth, 
it is now the task to see how the two are connected. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Before analyzing their in terelationship some relevant ~~ 
facts have to be stressed. First, as pointed out before, the I 
stagnation theory is a t heory which combines the law of 1
1 
vanishing investment opportunity and the psychological law 
of consumption. Decline of population growth was coming 
a t a time when the social income was rising . Consequently, 
saving was increasing when one of its former important out-
lets -- population growth -- became gradually narrowed down. 
Second, it has long been noted that , contrasted to the old 
wage fund theory, the poorer the people the higher the birth 
rate (also the higher the death rate) and the richer t he 
people the lower the birth rate (also the lower the death 
rate). Thus a different natural check seems to be involved 
in the accumulation of wealth, unless other forces set in. 
Early in 193$ Professor Hansen had already empha-
sized the importance of capital formation in the maintaining 
of prosperity and employment. He wa s following the line of 
Spietoff and Cassel by attributing greater importance to the 
independent activity of the capital goods industries. The 
i 
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word 'independent' here means the activities of the capital 
I goods industries are not induced b y the increase of the 
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I demand for consumer's goods, but precede it. For instance, 1 
he thought the recovery of 1937 was simply a consumption boom ·~~ 
which differed from the prosperity of the twenties in that the
1
l 
business investment led the way in the twenties while in the I! 
1 II 
recent recovery, investment followed consumption. Such kind I 
of recovery is not stable because expansion that is carried 
by the 'multiplier - acceleration principle' has severe 
limitations under a dynamic economy which saves a part of its 
income. Therefore, to maintain full employment new real 
investment must be created by technological progress, rise 
of new industries, discoveries of new resources, opening up 
. 2 
of new territory and the g rowth of populat1on. The first 
four investment outlets stimulate the businessman directly, 
but the fifth makes its influences felt only indirectly ex-
cept when its growth is tremendous. No businessman ever 
watched the population census for a guide to his investment 
policy. When population is increa sing he is most likely 
expanding his business according to the increased demand 
arising from it. Capital investments and the accompanying 
employment then become an induced condition, one which he 
believed to be unstable. This shortcoming, however, is not 
very critical because: 
1. vVhat he emphasized is the tremendous increase of 
population in the nineteenth century. The population of 
1 A. H. Hansen, Full Recgvery or St§;gnation (1938), 
p. 292. 
Ibid. p. 296. 2 
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England quadrupled in a hundred years; the whole of Europe 
tripled and t he United States increased fifteen-fold in a 
single century. This growth certainly would not fai 1 to 
stimulate the initiative of the businessman. In fact, the 
building of railroads and the land speculation during the 
westward movement in the United States were , to a large 
extent , deliberately done to meet the expected increase of 
population. 
2. Hansen emphasized strongly the demand of resi-
dential construction. He called this demand a "non-business 
capital expenditure" in order to differentiate it from :. that 
of pure consumption. Its effect on capital formation is 
therefore different from that coming out of in creasing con-
sumption. 
3. The effect of population growth on capital forma-
tion is more complicated than the other forces. It will not 
only provide additional demand, but also, the demand created 
is stable. Also, it w.ill effect the supply side by changing 
the efficiency and productivity of the working force. 
With these points regarding population clear the 
analysis of its relation to capital formationwill be dis-
cussed according to the following steps. 
First, is the analysis of the effects of population 
growth on the industries which, in the past, were largely 
I 
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stimulated directly by the tremendous increase of population. 1 
I 
Included in the category are railro~ds, publie utilities and~ 
II 
I 
I 
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construction. This is of particular importance because, as 
Keynes stated, buildings along with transportation and pub-
lic utilities are the main categories of long-term invest-
) 
ment. Second, is the analysis of the relation between the 
change of demand and capital formation. This includes the 
absolute increase in demand as well as the shift of demand. 
Both are the results of either the change in the family 
size or the change of age composition. Lastly, will be 
the relation between population growth and employment. 
As it was said, large business investment is the 
pivot of economic expansion and this investment can not be 
achieved merely through the temporary increase of the con-
sumer's consumption. Usually, heavy investment like that of 
the railroads can not reap its fruit i mmediately after its 
installation. Its profitableness depends upon t he expecta-
tion of large, continuous, as well as stable demand. In 
building a new railway the consideration is not only the 
profitableness of the existing railways, but also the 
I 
I necessity of projecting the background of profitableness I
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into the area which the new line will penetrate. In other 
words, a new project requires the emergence of a new market, 
superimposed on the existing one. Certainly no man will 
build a road into the desert. Resources must be there. 
Resources are potential income; its development depends upon 
3 J. M. Ke~mes, fl Treatise Q!l ~1oney (New York: 
court, Brace & Co., 1930). 
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the labor of the coming people. When the transcontinental 
railways were built the existing background was, of course, 
the usefulness of the railway and the natural resources lying 
ahead, but the prospective demand for its service certainly 
depended on the increase in population. One may question 
this argument by saying that the development of the automo-
bile industry came at a time when population growth had 
already lost its vigor and, therefore, the development of 
transportation and communication could be expected without 
the help of increasing population. This is equivalent to 
saying that 'new industry' is the really basic factor. As 
this is demonstrated by historical evidence no argument can 
be raised against it. However, when a new industry is com-
peting with an old one we should take into account the net 
capital formation. In the case of the railway and automo-
bile industries the net capital formation probably would have 
been smaller without the large increase of population at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
Greater simplicity is possible in describing the 
relation between population growth and the expansion of pub-
lic -u%ilities. Implici~ly, : public means a large number of 
people. Also, the development of public utilities depends 
more on the number of inhabitants than on their income. They 
can not be operated economically if the inhabitants are not 
numerous enough. Therefore, the public utilities are not 
likely to be found important in farm areas. From this we 
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may draw an inference: that the development of public 
utilities depends upon the number of cities or towns and the 
population of these cities or towns. 
Following is a table which shows the growth of the 
city's population. It should be noted that both the inten-
sive and the extensive growths of the city were considerable, \ 
:::n:o:::n:::::: :; :::u:::::~in:o:::::;t::: ::t:::l i:: of \1 
fluenced more than the former, and thus undermines our con-
tent ion. However, if the trend of people moving from farm 
to city will not be reversed, the expansion of the city and 
its number will still depend, to a large extent, on the 
increase of population. 
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Table 2 
GROWTH OF CITY POPULATION, 1780-1860 
Year Number of Cities Having a Population of 
Percentage 
of Total 
8,000 8,000 20,000 75,000 250,000 Population 
or to to to or in Cities 
over 20,000 75,000 250,000 over 
---
1780 5 4 1 2.7 
1790 6 4 2 3 . 3 
1800 6 1 5 4.0 
1810 11 6 3 2 4.9 
H~20 13 7 4 2 4.9 
1830 26 19 4 3 6.7 
1840 
1850 
1860 
44 28 11 4 1 8.5 
85 56 21 6 2 12.5 
141 96 35 7 3 16.1 
Source: H. U. Faulkne r, American ~conomic Historv, 
6th ed. (1949), p. 299. 
With respect to the relation between populati on 
growth and construction something has been said in the second 
chapter and more will be discussed later. Here attention will 
be once more given to the fac t that during the expansion 
period some urban constructi on was undertaken largely upon the 
expectation of population growth. Such expansion could hardly 
avoid disaster i.f population i n crease had not been as rapid 
4 
j as it was. This suffices to answer the contention that 
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4 J. M. Keynes, "Some Economi c Consequences of 
Declining Population Growth, " Eu~enic Review, 25. 
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annual population growth is not perceptible to the business-
'J man and that the increase in family income is more important 
II to residential construction than is the increase in family 
I size. In fact, a large annual increase in population was 
I 
I 
often more perceptible than was the increase in annual income 
and it was safer to predict many years of increasing popula-
tion than to predict many years of rising income. 
I 
I 
I 
The following table shows the annual population growth jJ 
and the capital expenditures on the dwelling units, the com-
parison of which clearly indicates their close relationship: 
Table 3 
I Yea r-- Population Growth 
(in 1,000) .1 
I 
I 
Dwelling Units 
Provided 
(in 1,000) 
--------------------·--------------------------------' 
I 
I 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
I
I 1931 
:1 1932 1933 
I 1934 
2,075 
1, 513 
1,895 
2,165 
1,719 
1,568 
1,640 
1,463 
1,269 
1,308 
964 
802 
738 
795 
878 
804 
772 
247 
449 
716 
871 
893 
937 
849 
810 
753 
509 
286 
212 
74 
54 
55 
144 
276 
286 
I 
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I 1935 
\ 1936 
1 1937 
[I 
\1 ~ion 
\' Source: S. Kuznet, Na=t=1.=. o:=.:n:::a:::=l ~==.n=c=o=m=e=a=n=d=C=a=o=i=t=a=l=F=o=rm=a=-= L 
1219-193.5., p. 40. Also: Building Construction, United I === 
878 
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~tates Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin !\ 
No. 693, n. 17. Also: Abstract of the United States (1943), 
p. 11. 
Giving more attention to the conditions that may affect i\ 
business expectation before any actual demand is taking place 
does not exclude the importance of the change in demand 
, general increase or decrease, and shift of demand. All these 
possible changes in demand have already been discussed. The 
purpose here is to see how these changes will affect the 
capital formation. 
According to the previous analysis of the family bud-
one-fourth in the higher income group . In the lower income 
group, doubling the size of the family increases by a little 
more than one-third its food expenditure; while, in the higher 
income group, the increa se in the expenditure on food is about 
one-fourth. When income level rises, the proportion of income 
spent on food in the family of equal size decreases from 40.9 
per cent to 25 per cent. This shows the income elasticity of 
food is far below the population ela sticity of food. 
The capital that should be provided for food produc-
tion is very difficult to calculate. Theoretically, the 
computation of the capital assets of the food industry should 
include the wholesale and retail service, a part of the assets 
I 
I 
in manufacture and transportation, as well as farm assets, but .I 
43 
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million dollars which represents 16 per cent of the total 
value of the nroducts and was the most important item among 
. . d 5 the seventeen 1mportant 1n ustry groups. 
I 
The expenditure on clothing occupies only 7-11 per 
I cent of the total budget It responds less to the change of 
I family size. Practical!~ no percentage change of clothing I 
1
11 
expenditure can be found in the lower and higher income groups ~~~~ 
when t h eir family size are changed. Only in the middle income 
I group does the relation between clothing expenditure and , 
I 
I 
family s ize become distinctive. The response in clothing I' 
i 
I 
expenditure to income change , however , is very large. In the 
large size family the increase of the percentage expenditure 
on clothing is approximately equal to the increase of the ner-
centage increase of income. 
To measure the capital invested in the clothing in-
dustry the same method can be used. Again, according to 
1
1
. Kuznet, the gross value of the textile and their products in 
,
1
1929 was 9,243 million dollars, which represents 13.1 per cent \ 
of the total value of the products and was the second most I 
I · ·t th · d · 1 6 
1
1mportant 1 em among e seventeen 1n ustrJ.a groups. 1 
I I 1 5 s. Kuznet, Commodity Flow and Capital Formation, I 
11 vol. I, 24. 
I
I 6 Kuznet, QI2.• cit., p. 25. 
I
I' ~-~==---== ~~~ Another figure that may be used as an approximate 
11 
\' I mea sure is the capital as sets of the textile industry. A ceo rd - 11 
I! ing to ,Fabric-an-t . So1omoh the capital assets of the textile li 
'1l, 1 1~· products excluding land were 1,703 million dollars in 1937, 
which ranked fourth among the seventeen manufacturers he 
1 studied and occupied about 8 per cent of the total. 7 
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Housing expenditure occupies a large percentage in 
the family budget no less than does the food expenditure. 
Like the clothing expenditure, its response to the income 
ch~nge is greater than to the change in family size, but both 
in inverse proportion. This is the reason why some economists 
believed that the small family will not denress residential 
construction. However, even this being true, the trend toward 
the small size family will, sooner or later, reduce the rate 
of increase in the number of families. In other words, the 
intensive spending in housing will in its turn reduce the 
extensive spending. 
Altogether the expenditures on food, clothing and 
housin g, which we - shaLL call necessi ty-spending, comprise about 
80 per cent in the lower income group, 74 per cent in the 
middle income group, and 60 per cent in the upper income group. 
The importance of the necessity-spending thus is apparent. 
7 Fabricant Solomon, Employment in Manufactures, 
1899-193.2. An Analysis of its ~.lation to the Yolume of 
Production. National Bureau of Economic Research (New York, 
1942), n. 257. 
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Table 4 
THE EXP~NDITURE OF NECESSITIES IN DIFFERENT 
FAMILY SIZE AND DIFFERENT INCOME 
I! 
\I 
I 46 
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d 
I 
=======I Small- Middle- Large- Average 
Size 2 Si.ze . .2 -~ Si,?: e .2.::.§ ___ 
Lower I ni:ome (1,000-1,249) 73.5 79.8 83.1 78.8 
Iviiddle Income (2, 250-2,499 ) 70 . 5 73.9 74.4 72.9 
Higher Income 
(4,000-4,999) 64.4 57.0 61.5 61.0 
Average 69.5 70.2 73.0 
----
-·------·-------· 
Source: From Table 1. 
By comparison of the two 'average' columns in the 
above table, again we discover that the income elasticity of 
1:1 the expenditure on necessities is greater than: its population 
I elasticity. (This will undermine s l ightly the importance of 
I the population change, but will not affect so much the stag-
\ nation theory because rising income is also a factor of stag-
11 nation.) This phenomenon will be more clear if we compare the 
\ change of the expenditure on necessities and the change of · 
I the expenditures on luxuries, in the following tables: 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I I . 
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I 
Table 5 
PERCENTAGE EXPENDITURE OF I NCOME 0~ NECESSITIES 
AND LUXURIES OF DIFFERENT INCOME LEVEL 
Lower- Middle- Higher-
income Income Income 
. . 
~ hQ.00-1 J 2~2) ( 2 J 25..Q., ,2 J 499 (~.ooo~.222) 
Miscellaneous 
Items (luxuries) 21.3 26.5 39.0 
Necessities 7$.$ 72.9 61.0 
-· ·- -·· . ·- -
Table 6 
PERCENTAGE EXPENDITURE OF I NCOIV"lE ON NECESSITIES 
AND LUXURIES OF DIFFERENT :b'AMILY SIZE 
Small-Size 
2 
-
Miscellaneous 
items (luxuries) 29.6 
Necessities 69.5 
-
-
Sources: From Table 1. 
- -- --· ---· --- ---
Middle-Size 
3-4 
-
29.5 
70.2 
- ~--
Large-Size 
5-6 
27.6 
73 .o 
These two tables clearly show that the expenditures 
47 
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Now, if the money saved from necessities is cornpletelyr-
spent on luxuries, then the money value of the total demand II 
remains the same; the net effect may be simply a shift of 
resources. Unfortunately, this is not realistic. First, as 
was shown in Table 1, saving is increased when the expendi-
tures on necessities are decreasing. Second, even were all 
the money saved from the necessities spent on the luxuries, 
the effect on capital formation might not shift in the same 
proportion and, consequently, the national income of the 
next period would depend on whether or not the luxuries a re 
more capital consuming than are the necessities. 
Professor Hansen said, "a rapid-growing population 
demands a much larger per-capita volume of new residential 
construction. A stationary populat i on may demand more per-
sonal services." Thus change from r apid growing ponulation 
to stationary population will "a lter the composition of the 
final flow of consumption goods so that the ratio of capital 
to output as a whole will tend to decline. nS 
The same reasoning was held by Keynes although he 
emphas i zed a little more the change of income level. For 
instance, he said, "consumption leve l if improved tend t o 
s pend more on service which shorten the period of p roduc-
tion." 9 He further contended that in the period from l$60 to 
8 A. H. Hansen, "Economic Progress and Declining 
Population,"QQ· cit., p. 4. 
9 J. M. Keynes, QQ. cit., p. 16. 
I 
I 
I 
1913 the technical period of production was not lengthened 
by more than ten per-cent if as such . " Consequently, the 
economic progress during the period "was primarily attributed 
. 10 
to the increasing populat1on--. " 
We had already analyzed the possible effects of the 
population changes, but here the question of increasing con-
sumption of personal services should be picked up. 
In dealing with this problem we should go tack to the 
items that comprise the miscellaneous item . Broadly it is 
comprised of entertainments (movies, music, etc.), education, 
medical service, domestic services, and so on. Study along 
this line has been very scarce. In the following only the 
study of Stigler on education and domestic services are 
mentioned which, although cannot embrace the whole field may 
at least convey its trend. 
Year 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
Table 7 
Domestic Servant 
( 1, 000) a 
1,509 
1,867 
1,485 
2,025 
2,098 
Index 
1,900=100 
100 
124 
98 
134 
139 
Education 
(1,000) 
509 
639 
835 
1,085 
1,162 
Index 
1900•100 
100 
126 
164 
213 
228 
a This series is too low, but it is comparable 
through time; it refers to persons at t ached to the industry 
whether employed or unemployed. 
Sources:G.Stigler, Trends in Employmenk and Output, 
1947, p. 74. 
10 "Ib id • , p • 17 • 
l 
_ _j_ 
From this table it is apparent that both the increase 
of educators and the increase of domestic servants are very 
rapid. If these two kinds of services can represent the total 
trend we can say that the emphasis of Keynes and Hansen is 
warranted. 
By comparing our previous analysis with Hansen and 
Keynes, it can be easily observed that what Hansen and Keynes 
emphasized was the average and representative case. This 
method is impressive, but it fails to cover the whole picture. 
On the other hand, there are some economists who make detailed 
distinctions even up to the change of demand from toys to 
walking sticks • . Clearly, no matter how rigid the economic 
system is, it will not be difficult to adjust such trifling 
changes. 
Thus, to strike a balance, it seems better to take 
industry as the unit of comparison and see whether tho~indus-
tries which wi 11 most likely decline under the declining popu-
lation growth require less capital per-unit output or per 
worker. In this respect .the work of Fabricant is very compre-
hensive and the following table is taken from his book ~mploy-
~ in Manufactures. 
50 
Table 8 
NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS, NET BOOK VALUE OF CAPITAL ASSET 
AND CAPITAL ASSETS PER WAGE EARNER, 1937 
-··· 
Industry No. of Wage Capital Assets Capital 
earners excl. land Asset per (1,000) (million) ·wage Earner 
I Food 789 2,269 2,876 
Beverage 86 562 6, 535 
!Tobacco Products 92 " ) 84 913 
Textile Products 1,834 1,703 929 
11 Petroleum Products 332 3,554 42,819 
!Stone, Clay and Glass 83 982 2,976 
I Products 
I Iron and Steel Products 330 3,284 3,442 
Automobile 779 982 2,050 
Transportation Equipment 950 434 2,893 
Electric l\IIachinery 309 396 1,282 
Total Manufacturing 8,584 21, 23 8 2,474 
From the above table it can be easily seen that the 
!capital-labor ratio in food manufacture, transportation equip-
ment, and building material is higher than is the average of 
total manufacture. All these are supposed to have close rela-
tion with population change. 
Besides this, an interesting fact is that the biggest 
capital consuming industries are petroleum products, beverage, 
and iron and steel products, which are influenced but slightly 
by the change of family size and age-composition. The old are 
I 
likely to spend more on beverages than dothe young, but the 
1 small family will spend less on them. The old tend to spend 
less on auto-traveling but the small family may spend more. 
Thus, on the whole, no considerable drop in the consumption of 
51 
beverage and petroleum products can be expected from the decline 
~ of population g rowth. 
\ The defect of this table is that no attention is given 
to the construction and service ind us tries ; but since their 
difference is very distinctive and as this difference is 
supported by some changes as mentioned above, we can conclude 
1that the Hansen-Keynes' contention is nearer the truth in this ' 
!aspect. 
I 
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Lastly, we shall deal with the question of unemployment 
under the condition of declining population growth: 
As it was commonly known, that one of the fundamental 
propositions of Keynes' theory is that the volume of employment 
is a function of the volume of investment. If decline in popu-
lilation growth discourages capital formation, then it will also 
~~discourage employment, This statement, while fundamentally 
\r rue, needs some elaborations, particularly since the declining 
population growth produces a gradual series of changes; at its 
r arious stages of development some different relations between 
j mployment and capital formation might arise. 
! The first sign of declining population growth is the 
' ·~reduction of the percentage of younger people. No appreciable 
lr hange in the labor force will be found, Thus the immediate 
lei ffect is the decline of consumption with a constant labor 
1 force. Other things being equal, employment will be cut in 
!order to adjust production to the lower level of demand. Of 
i\ course the condition will be worse if the number of the 1a bor 
li 
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1is also increased. This is the transitional stage which Pro-
fessor Hansen specially emphasized. After a certain period 
I 
1 the condition will be that not only the proportion of younger 
people will decrease, but the proportion of old people will 
increase also. The shift of demand will begin to show its full 
effect. ·we have already noted how these chan ges wi 11 affect 
capital formation. The shift was a one from the demand for 
necessities to luxuries or from the demand for capital consum-
1
ing goods to capital saving goods. Now the question is how it 
will effect employment. 
Partly due to technological reason and partly due to the 
change in relative price of the factors of production and inte r e t 
I, 
rate, the capital and labor rat:b of many commodities may be sub- il 
ject to frequent change. At the present time we shall assume 
that no change will take place in the above three fundamental 
factors. Therefore, all goods have, among themselves, a defi-
ite capital-labor ratio or, say, the period of production of 
ery commondity is constant. Also we shall adopt Keynes' term 
speaking of those commodities as having higher "elasticity 
employment" when a proportional increase {decrease) of effec~ : 
that commodity will give a larger (smaller) than 
11 portional increase of employment. Under this definition 
• • Keynes, ~neral Theory of EmHloyment, Interest 
~iQney {19.37), p. 282. "It measures the response of the num-
er of labor-units employed in the industry to changes in the 
umber of wage units which are expected to be spent on purcha s-
ng its outputs." Thus · 
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it is apparent that "if the increased demand is largely 
directed towards products which have a high elasticity of 
employment, the aggregate increase in employment will be 
greater than if it is largely directed towards products which 
1 have a low elasticity of employment." 
I Clearly, then, our question is whether or not the 
I 
1
\ luxuries have a lower elasticity of employment than the 
1
1 necessities. Keynes seemed to mean 'yes' ; but he gave no 
clear answer. For instance, in connection with the topic of 
shifting demand and the elasticity of employment he said, 
nsome products take time to produce, so that it is practically 
impossible to increase the supply of them quickly. Thus if 
additional demand is directed to them without notice, they 
will show a low elasticity of employment although it may be 
tha t, given sufficient notice, their elasticity of employ-
t "ll h "t n 12 men w1 approo. c un1 y. This would mean; first, in the 
long run, the elasticity of employment of all commodities 
ma y approach unity; and, second, those commodities which have 
-, 
a longer period of production will have the small elasticity 
of employment in the short run. Since the luxuries usually 
have a shorter period of production, 13 then a shift of demand 
-12 I!li.£! ., p. 287. 
13 Because luxuries require more labor than capital 
or less capital per labor. According to Lederer, "Bohm Bawerk 
the lengthenin g or shortening of period of production is the 
same as that of a higher or lower capital-labor ratio." E. 
Lederer, Technical PrQg~e~ and. UnernTloyment agEfiJuiry in tQ_ 
~ Obstacles 1Q Econo~c ExQansiQUGeneva, 1938 , p. 157. 
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to luxuries will ··. brihg about employment easily. 
can also say that the luxuries take more time to 
Howe~ 
produce am 'I 
hence have low elasticity of employment. Besides, luxuries, 
in the meaning of scarcity may not increase elasticity of 
employment even if sufficient notice is given. 
remark made by Keynes seems to justify this interpretation: 
"Perfect stability of price is impossible in an economy sub-
j ect to change" and "Price-in stability arising in this way 
does not lead to the kind of profit stimulus which is liable 
to bring into existence excess capacity. nl4 Luxuries can not 
be produced on a large scale by extending their period of 
production when the demand is increasing . Price will rise 
but not production. No additional capital will be required 
and hence employment will not increase. 
This conclusion, however, has been questioned by 
some economists. For instance, Dr. King , after making a com-
parison of the employment in different countries concluded 
that "the figures show clearly that countries in which capital \ 
investment per employee is low have little unemployment while I 
prosperous, highly capitalistic countries have much unemploy-
ment, 11 so, "volume of employment is related to in vestment 
only indirectly and the idea that technological progress is 
necessary to prevent unemployment seems to be contrary to 
fact." 15 
14 J. M. Keynes, Q.Q• cit., p. 287. \ 
15 I. w. King,"Are We Suffering From Economic I 
\ Maturity," Journal of Political Economy (1939), p. 614. 
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This argument is basically right because labor saving 
I 
means simply the replacement of labor. However, in most cir- 1 
cumstances, labor saving in one industry will be accompanied l 
by an expansion in the industries which provide this labor- 1 
saving capital. Unemployment will result from labor-saving 
invention only when (1) labor saving is combined with capital 
I 
saving, (2) expansion in the capital goods industries is not 
enough to absorb replaced laborers and (3) no emergence of 
new industries occurs when the second condition is not real-
ized. The first condition is not frequent. The third con-
dition is uncertain; but the large number of people employed 
in the capital goods industries shows that their capacity of 
absorbing employment is enormous. 
Another defect of Dr. King ' s argument is that the 
phenominal difference between the capitalistic economy and 
the handicraft economy can not well explain the change within 
the capitalistic economy. Indeed , in the handicraft economy 
the employment per unit output is very high and the fluctua-
tion in one industry has less effect on another industry. 
Also a slight increase in demand will be enough to bring 
about full employment and a slight decrease in demand give 
only limited unemployment. In the capitalistic economy the 
adjustment is much more complicated; a slight change in de-
mand may induce a large amount of unemployment. But this 
difference does not mean that a shift to handicraft economy 
will solve the unemployment problem of the capitalistic 
lj 
economy. At least it is not the best way. Besides, as we 
sha ll see, a shift of demand from the capital consuming in-
dustry to capital saving industry will, during its process, 
also produce unemployment. The demand itself will require 
more employment; but the adjustment will bring about umem-
ployment. 
I y !j-----
1 
We call a thing a luxury simply because it is not 
subject to the method of mass production and, therefore, 
scarce . The shift of demand from a $2,000 automobile to a 
$2,000 furcoat will drive those who, directly and indirectly, !I 
are working for this automobile out of work; but the increase 
of demand for furcoats can not expand to a degree which will 1 
absorb this unemployment because it is impossible to increase 
fur-bearing animals in a short period. The result, then, is 
most probably the increase of the value of the furcoat in-
stead of the lengthening of its period of production. Just 
as Keynes had said, the shift of demand ·from necessities to 
luxuries will lead to the mal-distribution of wealth instead 
of calling into use excess capacity , and increasing employ-
ment. The mal-distribution of wealth again calls out a new 
wave of spending on luxury and creates a large amount of 
saving which will aggravate unemployment. 
In the long run, even the furcoat can be produced in 
large quanti ties by calling more people into this tra~e; but, I' 
unless it can be produced by the capitalistic method, (as the
1 
automobile, was a luxury in 1900, through mass production has i 
' 
===; _ 5EL=== 
become a necessity at the present time) it would mean change 
from capitalistic economy to a somewhat handicraft economy. 
Employment is increased at the expen8e of productivity, for 
I 
instance we can not s~y the Eskimos are rich because everyone ! 
has a furcoat. National products or, say, economic welfare 
will fall instead of rising. 
Thus, in conclusion, we might say that the effects 
of declining population growth are unfavourable both to capi-
tal formation and to employment by reason of: price instabil- 11 
i ty, acceleration and multiplier principle, and adverse busi- 11 
ness expectation. 
II 
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CHAPTER VI. DECLINING POPULATION GROV·lTH AND THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
1 
i 
II 
While there were less questions about economic stag- ~~ 
nation's being primarily a long run secular trend, its role I 
in the explanation of business cycle was, however, questioned ~~~~ 
by a large number of economists. The reasons given by them 
;I 
were numerous1 but their main arguments can be grouped as 
follows: 
1, The population cycle, if there were such a cycle, 2 
is essentially a long cycle; while business cycle, in its 
usual sense, is a short cycle. Just like the factors that 
are responsible for business cycle can not be used to 
the seasonal variation, so the factors that affect economic 
trend can not be used to explain cycles. 
Jl 
In fact, even the stagnationists themselves often ad-
mitted this point. For instance, Benjamin Higgin said,"--
for the doctrine of economic maturity to have an independent 
meaning of its own, it must be distinguished from all types 
of cycle theories, and treated as a theory of long term trend. J" 
I 
I ~instance, Professor Schumpeter holds that 
"changes in population although they are certainly amorr~ the 
most ulterior effects, have no place among the casual of eco-
nomic cycle." and "the rate of increase of population decline 
imperceptibly per year. They may affect contour lines over 
time and bend ~hem down~ard; but they can not e~plain the il 
weakness relat1vely to 1ts predecessor of any g1ven prosperit~ 
and they look absurd in the rule of explaining factors of a 11 
sudden slump. "Business Cycle, Vol. II, 1939, p. 1036. J 
2 Losch constructed a 33 years cycle by using the , 
figures of total population, Newman constructed a cycle of •I 
about 19 years by using the figures of annual increment ofpop-
ulation. A shorter cycle probably can be constructed by using IJ 
I~ 
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own special doctrine of stagnation as a theory of trend. n3 
2, Population change is an external factor. It can 
not explain the \~rking of the economic organism itself. As 
Professor Haberler pointed out that "historical experience I' 
II 
seems to demonstrate that the cyclical movement has a strong li 
II 
neous influences at work which can plausibly be hold responsi -+, 
tendency to persist even if there are no outstanding extra-
ble."4 
These two arguments seem strong enough to repudiate 
any effort destined to link the population growth with busi-
ness cycle. However, under careful scrutiny we shall find 
that the above arguments still show some loopholes. 
I 
I 
First, the long run factors often exerts influences 
upon the short run movement. Although the factors that are 
responsible for the cyclical fluctuation can not explain the 
seasonal variatiort, the difference between one and the other 
is clearly conditioned by the cyclical factors. In other 
words, the amplitude and the regularity of ths shorter cycle 
was often determined by the long cycle. If this is true, 
factors involved in the secular trend will certainly affect 
I; 
I 
2 tcont'd.) the figure of annual increment over the : 
increase of the preceding year. 
3 Higgin, B., Income, Employment and Public Policy-- 1 
Easies in Honor££ Alvin H. Hansen. 1948, 91. · 
~ G. Harberler, ~rosperity and ~epression, 1946, p. 10. 
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external and internal factors did not give thought to which 
is more important. The distinction is made largely for the 
sake of exposition. For instance, the exogeneous force was 
sometimes defines as "the originators or disturbers of endo-
geneous processes, with power to accelerate, retard, inter-
rupt, or reverse the endogeneous movement of the economic 
system."5 
Following this we could expect that the studies made ' 
on the relation between the population growth and business 
cycle will focus attention on the influence of population 
growth upon the amplitude or intensity of the cycle. 
Professor Hansen, in his book 'business Cycle' gave 
credit to Pohle, Spietoff and Cassel for their work on t he 
analysis of the relation between population growth and busi-
6 
ness cycle. · The work of the first two authors are written 
in German and have not been translated. Therefore, only the 
work of Cassel will be mentioned here. 
According to Cassel, the upswing of the cycle will be l: 
carried longer in a society where population is increasing. 
It is so because "every increase of the population demands a 
corresponding increase of fixed capital of the community."'] 
and "when full employment is reached expansion can keep on 
I 
only when additional labor forces are provided by the increase 
I 
of population, immigration or internal migration from farm to 
...:.-.-. 5 'Ibi.Q.., p. 11. 
6 A. H. Hansen, Business Qycle, 1927, p. 25. 
7 G. Cassel, Social ~cono~, Vol. II, p. 622 (1923) 
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industry." Thus, the full effect of the population growth is '' 
the increase of the amplitude of the cycle and therefore," a ' 
community with constant population might succeed in keeping 
the conjuncture movement within narrow limits."8 
Clearly this theory is incomplete and, in many points, 
the analysis is obscure. 11 
1, No automatic mechanism was ever provided to equip 
new population with capital. It is an indirect and uncertain 
process by which need is transformed to effective demand. 
2, The effect of population growth on labor supply is 
a slow process. The immediate effect of population growth is II 
increasing the demand for consumer's goods rather than the il 
increase of the labor supply. Therefore it c~n not prolong 
1
11 
the economic expansion when full employment is reached, In- j, 
flation is probably the immediate result. 
Simply extending the upswing can not determine the 
amplitude of the cycle unless we can prove that the depressio~ 
li 
will also be ' extended. Cassel made no explanation on the ll 
lower turning point, but in the light of our previous analysis 
the downswing may be caught by the increase of population. II 
Those who think that the increase of population during the 
downswing will aggravate unemployment can not be interpretated 
. 11 
as saying that business is more depressed. In fact, increase
1 ,I 
of population does not mean an increase of labor supply and I 
!Qi.Q.' p. 623. 
II 
IL_ 
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the effect on consumption will likely outbalance its strain on, 
the wage. If the population is declining or even stationary 1 
during the downswing then it is most likely that the depres-
sion will be prolonged . Thus, a priori, Cassel's assertion 
I 
that the cycle will be less intense in a stationary populatio~' 
is, at least, not conclusive. 
Now we have noticed that the point of emphasis in the 1
1 
study of population change and business cycle was what Pro-
fessor Schumpeter called the contour line of the cycle. But 
this does not mean that the effort to explain the rhythmic . 
pattern of business cycle is completely ignored. In the 
following we shall make a study on some of the outstanding 
analysis which '•.rere destined to explain the whole process 
(of movement) of the business cycle. 
First, is the study of Professor Losch who found out 
two cyclical relationship between population and other eco-
nomic series. One is the comparison of the labor supply 
series and the crop series. The other is the comparison of 
the population cycle with the total production and the pro-
duction of producer 's goods. In the former case, he found 
that "before Germany entered the highly capitalistic stage 
these two series had every important trough and peak in com-
mon." Yet the defect is he did not make out the findings 
after Germany had been industrialized, and the change of la-
bor supply is but one aspect of population change. In the 
latter case, his finding was: "between 1862 and 1932 there 
were only two time-lags of similar origin. The War of 1870 
I 
and the severe crisis of 1873 break the connection for a time; 
I 
and only after a three year's lag do the facts of population !
1 
movement make themselves felt again. And there is a one year 1, s 
_ I, lag after the world war; again population is going ahead, and li 
it is production that follows. But during the rest of the 
period there ·is a parallel tendency, not only the whole but 
from year to year as well; both series rise and fall concom-
itantly, although to a different degree. Hence a pretty 
close correlation between population and production can not 
be denied.n9 The main weakness of this analysis is the 33 
year population cycle. This is a German Cycle, to a certain 
degree European cycle, but it can not be found in the United 
States and other countries. 
Although the same kind of coincidence can not be 
found in the Uni ~ed States·, the study itself seems worth-
while to reconsider. ~e have already noted that there are 
three ways to construce a population cycle. Losch used the 
first, i.e., the total population, which is not'what we have 
been interested in. The stagnationist, from~he beginning, 
emphasized more the annual increment of population than that 
' of total population. Therefore, if we are to study economic 
stagnation, the cycle of annual increment of population 
should be used. 
Cycle", 
9 -x:-rosch, "Population Cycle as a Cause of Business ;· . 
Quarter lz J oumal of ~onqmi c s, August, 193 7, p. 64 9.
1
1 
6 
In 193S, the National Resources Committee made a 
study on the relation between population growth and the in-
dices of income created by nine important industries. The 
period covered only seventeen years from 191S to 1934 and 
both the series of total population and the annual increment 
in population were given. 
The conclusion they gave is that the "variations in 
the increments of population growth'' has only "gradual 
I 
effect 1 
on the trend of total population and even more gradual effect jl 
on the adult population which alone is economically produc-
tive." Consequently, "the cause of the cyclical depression 
must be sought primarily in the analysis of industrial and 
financial relations rather than in the short time effect of 
changing trends in total population."10 
Apparently this conclusion emphasized the points 
which we have found doubtful ; therefore, no more arguments 
will be given to it. What should be mentioned here is that 
some economists use the series of annual population incre-
ment to explain building cycle. If that is justifiable, 
I 
there is no reason why this series can not be used profitably ! 
li 
to explain the industrial income fluctuations. Of course, I' 
this seventeen years series is not long enough to serve the 11 
purpose inhand; but one striking point is that the absolute 1! 
10 National Resources Committee, The Problem of 
Changing Population, 193S, p. 29. 
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increment of population began to drop after 1924 and the 
average annual rate of increase of these industrial incomes 
during the period 1921-1925 is much higher than that during 
1: 
.~ 
1925-1929. Thus ~~th more refined methods and more complete 
data, it is not improbable that some explanation can be found J1 
Next is the approach that was based upon the facts 
that the factors which directly affect the change of the vol-
ume of population, like marriage rate, birth rate, mortality 
rate, etc., are in themselves subject to cyclical fluctua-
tions. If these fluctuations can be found to have close re-
lation with the business cycle, then, theoretically, there 
must be some relations between population and business cycle ll 
also. Among these factors the marriage rate has received 
particular emphasis because it is by this factor alone that 
the amount of new population and the number of new families 
are determined. 
Two studies made in connection with the change of 
marriage rate and business cycle will be discussed below. 
The first is the study of the relation between the marriage 
rate and the residential construction; the second is the 
study of the relation between the change of marriage rate 
the general business cycle and real wage. 
With respect to the first, the National Resources 
Committee made a comparison between the marriage rate and the 
construction of family-unit of 257 cities between 1918 and 
1936. Its finding was that "the movement of the index of ur-
ban residential construction began well before the downward 
trend of marriage during the depression" and "the peak and 
decline of residential construction may be explained as the 
I 
reaction to an urban housing shortage in the early twenties," I' 
which was due to (a) interruption of normal activity during 
the war, (b) immigration and (c) movement from farm to cities." 
I 
1 . h h h k d d · 11ll T w 1c overs oot t e mar an en to a recess1on. his 
study is convincing enough to disrepute the relation between 
marriage rate and business cycle seems not enough to disprove [: 
the importance of population change. In fact, all the three 
factors mentioned meant a change of population, and the first 1 
i 
factor may even be interpretated as an interruption of mar• 
riage due to war. 
The second group of studies was made by D. S. Thomas 
and D. V. Glass. Thomas made a comparison of the marriage 
rate and the business cycle of England from 1854 to 1913. 
Her conclusion was that "there is, on the whole, a high 
correlation between the business cycle and the marriage 
rate." No lag can be isolated and "the response of the mar-
riage rate to the business cycle occurs almost immediately 
for rnos t cycles." Unfortunately she admitted that "no ob-
vious explanation" can be made to these close connexions and 
only some probably factors were given.l2 
11 Ibid., p. 30. 
12 D. S. Thomas, Social Aspect of Business Qycle, 
1925, chapter 2. 
I• 
======================================================== 
==~qB == 
Glass' study, as he stated, was simply a refinement of 
Thomas' study. He used a refined marriage rate and compared 
it with the index of the real wage. The reason he gave was 
that "if there is any economic influence upon marriage it 
should make itself most strongly felt through real earnings 
discounted for unemployment." His conclusion was also affirm-
ative but he believed that, with the change in 'more' and 
other social change as compulsive education, social insurence j[ 
etc., "it is only to be expected that the marriage rate 1 
should become less strongly linked with the fluctuation of 
real wage."13 
Grant these two studies are reliable, it gives the 
impression that they are simply to explain how business cycle 
or the change of real wage will i nfluence the marriage rate 
and no more. However , one point worthwhile to mention is that 
the conclusion of Glass is a warning to the use of marriage I 
rate as a data for studying the relationship between popula-
tion change and business cycle. Consequently, it makes the 
conclusion of the National Resources Committee l ess critical 
to the stagnatioh th~ory as it was conceived. 14 
Finally, we shall consider the most popular and em-
phasized relation between the building cycle and the popula-
I 
---· 3 D. -v. Glass, "Marriage Frequency and Economic Flucl 
tuations in England and Wales", in Political Ari thmatics edi- lj 
ted by L. Hegben, 193 8. 1! 
14 "Consideration of changes in number of families in 
relation to the volume of residential constructions affords a 11 
critical test of this thesis (stagnation)." In its analysis, " 
the Committee uses the marriage rate instead of the number of 
f ami lies , p. 3 0 • li 
! 
tion change: 
Some of the relations have been noted before; here 
only the detailed analysis of its cyclical pattern will be 
brought up. 
This study is much more important than the two men-
tioned above. The reason is that not only the effects of 
population growth made its impact on economic activity 
largely through its direct influence on building industry 
which took a vital part in the total capital formation ; but 
also , because the building cycle is a long cycle of about 19 
years and possessing a nature which is more conductive to 
comparison with the annual population increase. 
The conclusion of Kuznet in regard to the relation 
between population growth and co nstruction had been quoted 
in the second chapter. That conclusion was made from the 
foll-owing table of fluctuations in t he rate of growth of the 
net construction and the population: 
Table 9 
Fluctuations in Rate of Growth, 1869-1938 
Percentage Deviation from Straight Line or 3 Point Curve 
Fitted to Rate of Percentage Change Between Overlapping 
Decades 
Central Year of Period Net Construction Population 
1876 -20.6 0.5 
1881 - 1.9 0.5 
1886 11 .1 0.3 
1891 - 6.1 
-0.4 
1896 15.2 -0.7 
1901 12.5 0.3 
1906 23.9 0.4 
1911 
- 5.3 0.2 
1916 16.2 
-0.6 
1921 159.1 0.3 
1926 66.0 0.6 
1931 69.5 -0.7 
Source: Kuznet, s., National Income, £. Summary Qf 
Findings, 1946 p. 70. 
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In the above table he found that "in the last two 
1: 
swirigs the peak and trough in the rate of change in construe- ., 
tion and in population are synchronous except for the peak in i 
the last, and even in the first swing, construction, like pop-
ulation, reaches a peak later than the rate of change in na-
tional income." and "thus definitely suggest their correla-
tion." 
We shall take for granted that this conclusion is 
definite but the data he used seems not quite in line with 
what the stagnationists emphasized. Since the absolute in-
crement of population is.more important than the relative 
rate (especially when it was compared with the net construe-
tion) it is better to use the data of the former and conse-
quently the annual figure is better than "the central year 
of period" which he used. In this respect, the follovdng 
study of Newman seems to us more promising • 
. I I; Newman's study covered seventeen cities from 1875 to 
1933. The figure of population growth was annual net in-
crease computed largely from the ratio of the school enroll-
ment in the first eight grades to total population. Data on 
building was the building permits, adjusted changes in build-
ing cost. The population series was smoothed by taking a 
five year moving average and the building permits was smooth- ! 
ed by a seven year moving average. I! 
II 
· Comparing these two series he found that "both curves ,I 
show three major cycles with approximately the same turning 111 
I 
II 
jl 
II 
I 
/turning points, and the same order of magnitude. 11 The time lag is 
I 
not uniform but" there is a tendency for population growth to II 
anticipate major changes in building activity by a year or two. 11 ~5 
He explained this building cycle as fundamentally due 
to the durability and immobility of the buildings. For its immo- i 
. 'I lbility, a change or a move of population will call for new 
I buildings without the depletion of the old and, therefore, an 
influx of population is particularly vital to the building in-
l dustry's activity. For its durability, tbat its cyclical rluc-
l tuation is severe than other industries and the replacement aac 
I year averages only 3 to 4 per-cant of the total supply. 
j Because of these characteristics, it is only through thl 
! increase of demand by the influx of people that price of the 1 
! existing facilities will be bid up. Profitability of these 
I 
j structures than leads entrepreneurs to erect new ones and a 
,, major cycle is thus underway. 
i The existing of the population cycle was explained by 
/ Newman as "the innovation which attracted people to new center 
,I 
l1 spends itself or new counterbalancing influan~es arise, ao that 
II the population growth greatly diminishes or may even cease. 11 
16 
I 
I 
I 
Ap~arently this explanation can not account for there 
I being such a twenty year population cycle. It may be, hawever, 
! 
city J justifiable to explain t~e cyclical phenomena because the 
,, 
I 
15 W.H.New.man, The Building Industr~ and Business 
The University of Chicago Press. 1935. p. 3o. 
16 Ibid. ,p. 48. 
I 
Cycle jl 
I' ,, 
rl 
11 
-v;opulation, aside from being affected by the natural growth of 
~~ ~opulation, was largely influenced by the internal migration or 
immigration which, to a certain extent, followed the industrial 
activity of the city. If building industry plays an important 
I part in the total industrial activities, it is conceivable that 
its fluctuat~on will affect the population movement. 
The reason of time lag was explained thus:(l)informatio 
about the demand and supply for new space is very scarce so the 
I supply and demand can not always meet each other,(2) since ~ver~ 
producer worka independantly, there are duplications in the J 
effort to satisfy given demand,(3)income for existmng structure 
tends to be maintained by lease and reluctance to move, even 
though . the demand for new apace has definitely declined,(4) 
promoters of new buildings may be aware of the adequacy of axis 
ing space, yet unwary investers still subsribe to real estate 
securities and thus become the owners on the assumption that 
conditions in this very imperfect market are still favourable." 
For these reasons the over supply of building during 
the boom caused excess space to hang over the market detering 
even building for replacement. Decline in activity as iniated 
by the slowing of demand becomes aggravated by the overexpansio 
of t he preceding boom. Activity will continue at a low level un 
til demand picks up owing largely to another inflax of population. 
Beside the discussion of this twenty years cycle in the 
17 Ibid.,p.49. 
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I 
!building industry ha also discovered a minor cycle which averagetl· 
from four to five years in length and corresponded in many res- [ 
pects to the Mitchellean concept of the business cycle. In the [I 
minor cycle he found that the determining factor is the ease or I 
!difficulty of borrowing in the long term ~oney market. Populatioft 
l growth is simply the underlying .force. This sounds as though po- l 
1l pulation growth can explain only part of a special type of busiJ 
ness cycle. However, as he said, 11the major and minor cycles in I 
I
I building industry are closely interwoven and react upon each 
I 
other, e.g., the forces acting in the major cycle are also those [ 
18 
which determine the height and depth of the minor movement." I 
Thaa his study and conclusion is quite similar in principle to 
those of Cassel. Population growth is only one of the factors 
which determine not only the rhythmic pattern but the height 
and depth of the business cycle. 
18 Ibid. ,p.50. 
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CHAPTER lV A REVIEW OF THE m~TI-STAGNATION THEORY 
Arguments Qg stagnation theor~: In view of the fact 
that every long run economic theory has been susceptible it 
is not strange to see that the stagnation theory, at its pre-
sent stage of development, is- as much attacked as it is support~ 
ed, both in its general thesis and in its population aspect. rn11 
this chapter, it is intended to review briefly these contro-
l versies in order to pave the way for the consideration of popu-
lation policy. 
As it has been stated above, the stagnation theory is 
composed of two laws:; 1) the Keynes 1 psychological law of con-
sumption and saving and 2) the Hansen's law of vanishing invest-
ment opportunity. The interaction of t hese two laws gave rise 
to the long run secular deficiency of marginal efficiency of z ' 
capital in respect to the long run secular increase of saving. 
Now, we shall see that both laws are questioned by the so-called 
anti-stagnationists. 
First they belmeved that even the psychological law 
were true it would not be that dangerous. George Terborgh found ;! 
that the national saving and the national investment equal, re- '· 
trospectively. The "history of saving is the history of invest-
ment." He also found that a "tendency for investment to exceed 
saving is evidenced by an upvo~ard movement in the national in-
come and the inclination for saving to exceed investment on the 
other hand is reflected in a downward movement of national in-
1 
come. 11 The question is that the tendency of investment over 
74 
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saving in prosperity, or saving over investment in depression is 
business behaviour not consumer's. In fact, this law states that 
I 
the tendency which Terborgh observed can not be kept long I 
because, sooner or later, the increase in saving will outmatch I 
the increase in investment and the downturn will begin. Statist l iL 
cally, Kuznet had found out that the percentage of national in-
come going to capital fo~~ation during the years 1869-1929 had 
remained constant while the national income, at the same period, 
2 
rose rapidly. This clearly shows an increasing amount of sav-
ing and it also shows many of the savings did riot go into capi-
tal formation. The inequality of capital formation and saving 
and the equality of investment m1 and saving is not contradic-
tory. It means that the savings have partly vanished through 
the C¥clical process of income and price. 
Second is the denial of the la:vl of vanishing investment 
opportunities. This can be resolved into the arguments over 
population, technological development, diecovary and exploiata-
tion of new frontiers, use of replacement reserve. The popula-
tion factor will be discussed among these later. 
The argument over the future technological progress is 
somewhat like gambling. The stagnationist predicts that there 
IN&-.. S 
~ a tendency of capital saving inventions and a relative 
dearness : of great ne\v industries. However, they did not give 
1 George Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Matur~ty,l946. 
pp . 166-167. 
2 Simon Kuznet, National Product Since 1869. p. 50. 
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II enough evidence to support their view and the anti-stagnationist II 
found that there is nou statistical evidence up to 1929u and u il 
almost any new process t~~t is economically workable will econo- i 
3 I 
Jmize both capital and labor." The stagnationist drew their in- / 
II 
I ferences from the consumption trend but clearly it is not the 
only important factor in determining the technological develop- II 
ment. The entrepreneur as well as the individual scientist may ,, 
also create demand. What the final direction will be , nobody 
1
, 
can tell. Professor Schumpeter rightly pointed out that the i 
1 
teclmological possibilities are an 'uncharted sea' and that '1 
there is no 'closing of humanity's frontier.' He also stated x 
I 
11 that 11 the inventions are not coming out in the order of produc- jj 
l tivity; those that are still in the lap of gods may be more or II 
less productive than ahy that have thus far come within our I 
range of observationn and "the future technological progress 
may--- through systemization and rationalization of research 
and of management, to become more effective and sure footed." 
Beside this he believed that, even in the absence of new great 
I invention,"the mere utilization of the achievement of the age 
i of electricity and the production of modern homes for the masse,
1 
1 would suffice to provide investment opportunities for quite a I 
5 I 
long time." Thus, it seems unwarranted to worry about the 
future inventions and the troubles experienced in the thirties 
3 J.A.Schumpeter, 
York. 1942. p. 117. 
4. Ibid., p. 118. 
5. Loc. cit., 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 
\ ~e~e not caused by the change of the nature of technological in-! 
I 
Ventions. w: shall not stress too much these conjunctures. The II 
discovery of atomic energy is an ironical proof of the indepen- 1 
dance of invention and consumption deeds. I 
The disappearance of the new frontier has been attacked b1 
Tergorgh who held that this is a thing far ahead of the thirtieJI 
and therefore not a cause of economic atagnation. This \'las \1 
answered by the stagnationist that what they emphasized is the 
exploitation of the frontier not simply the frontier itself. 
Granted that the argument is around the meaning of exploi~tatio , 
it would mean the appear~nce of diminishing return. But this 
has also been objected on the ground that" the decreasing rate 
of increase in population removes from the range of practical 
considerations the idea that nature's response to human effort 
either already is or must soon become less generous than it 
has been" and "technologival progress effectively turned the 
6 
tables on any such tendency," Obviously, this objection should I 
technological possibilities. 
II 
I 
be valued in connection with the population factor and the 
Beside this, the anti-stagnationists also raised the 
I question of the ability and possibi l ity to find other invest-
\ 
I 
1l 
ment outlets. Professor Schumpeter called to the attention that 
"the conquest of the e.ir may well be more important than the 
conquest of India was --- we must not confuse geographical 
,, 
li ----6~I~b-:-i-::-d-. ,-p-.-:;-1~16"'".----
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f'rontier with the economic ones." This, however, does not 
mean geographical frontier is not important. A nation small 
like Luxemburg can not hope to develop in a scale like the I 
!' United States even her people possess full scientific knowledge ~ . 
Without technological invention this factor, in fact, 
only handicap of long run secular expansion. 
is the I I' 
Ji 
Other argument in cor..nection ivi th the investment I oppor- 1i 
tunities is the growing size of the replacement reserve. This, 
according to the stagnationists, vrill make the absor-ption of 
,
1 
the private saving difficult. However, the anti-stabnationists 
hel6. that the replacement opportunities will increase more 
B 
than these funds. Change in demand and change in fashion were 
accounted for these opportunities, for instance, 11 the automo-
bile plantsvrere not financed from the depreciation account of 
railroads.~:- .. But what to do "Vlith the depreciation account of 
the railroads \vas not answered. There is possibility that the 
che.nge of demand will require less the reserve that has been · 
accumulated. 
In concludine; the above argurnents we may say that the 
saving of the people conceal their unlimited vmnts which, in 
turn, discurage investment activities. Remedy to this depends 
on the enviromental factors that \'Till stimulate the iniative 
of the entrepreneurs. In the near future the existence of thesej, 
7 Ibid.,p.ll7. 
8 G. Terborgh, QQ.cit.,p.ll9 
9 Schumpeter, £Q.cit.,p.ll7 
I' 
I' ~ I. 
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factors seems not so gloomy as the stagnationists believe. 
Argument .Q!L_declining 'QOpulationn grovrth: The arguments!; 
over the relation between populatiibn grov1th and economic stag-
nation has been sporatically mentioned in the previous chapters1• 
Here these arguments will be summarized for the purpose of 
clarification. 
1. Declining rate of population grovTth began early in 
1870 therefore it is not a cause of the stagnation of the thir-
ties. This has been answered by the stagnationists that it was 1 
the decline of the absolute increment of populati.om that affects 
the general economic activities and this decline was conclusive-
ly a phenomenon after 1925. Since our greatest concern is the 
1 amount of annual net investment the absolute rate certainly 
bears a closer relation to it than the relative rate. How·ever, 
even this rate is denied by Schumpeter. For instance, he said, 
"A considerable absolute decline would raise additional problem!. 
These we shall neglect however, because this can not be expect-1 
10 1 
ed to occur during the space of time under consideration~' This I 
II 
argument seems not so valid because, if the rate of decline of 
the thirties continues, the amount will certainly be considera-
ble. 
2. Countries with a high rate of population gro-v1th 
have not increased more per-capita production than those with 
slow population growth. For instance, France had a higher per-
capita wealth than England and Germany. However, this differen-
ce does not necessarily come from population change. According 
79 
to Goldenburg, France has a more equitable distribution of 
I 
wealth and a large amount of capital exports which are the mainll 
11 
reasons for the high per-capita wealth. 
3. Over the relation between saving and the decline of 
population grow·th the opinions of the anti-stagnationist are 
not very clear. Those who believed that there will be an in-
creasing amount of saving during the de.cline of population 
growth did not consider it serious because investment can, in 
any way, absorb it. This argument has been proved ~nvalid. 
There are also those who believe t bat the declining birth r ate 1 
will bring out declining rate of saving becasue both phenomena 
flo\v from the same psychological source and there is a causa~l 
connection bet\'reen these two. This implies that the motive to 
reduce the size of the family is to increase or maintain ~er-
'1 
sonal consumption. For instance, Schumpter said, 11 the ~rovisionl 
I 
for an indefinite family future is of central importance in il 
12 
the scheme of bourgeois motivation by childlessness." 
not deny that this motive is there but the study of the family 
budgetbad shown that the small family increase more savings 
than consumptions. Lastly, there are those who believed that 
the increase of the old aged people will reduce the savings. 
In this respect, our conclusion has been that hthe old people 
will save less but the prepararion of old and the support of 
10 Ibid. ,p.ll8. 
11 Le'Ori Goldenburg, "Savings in a Stationary Population" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1946. p.52 
12 J.A.Schumpeter, Business Cycle Vol. 11. p .l035 i 
II 
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the old \'Till increase the savings. 
4. The argument that declining population grov,rth will 
not increase the expenditures on luxuries as Keynes predicted 
seems very strmng but the stagnationists thought of increasing 
income at the same time. Those argue that the small families 
and the old spent more on housing have also strmng reason but 
, as pointed out before, they neglect the demand for new house 
through the increasing number of families. 
5. The effects of the change of age composition were also 
crmticized by Schumpeter. He contended that uAlthough they I 
I 
are beginning to assert themselves already--there is practically 
such a thing as 'lobby of the old'-- we can not go into them ~~ 
either. But it should be observed that, as long as retiring age:l 
II 
I 
II 
1: ,, 
remain the same, the percentage share of those who have to be 
provided for without contributing need not be affected by a 
13 
decreasing percentage of persons under fifteen." This criti-
cism overlooks the shift of demand and the shift of burden 
which are certainly accompany the change of age composition. 
Base1on the above arguments it seems the conclusion is 
difficult to make. However, the weakness of the anji-sta.gnation! 
1 
ist is that they did not take account the factor of ezpectatiol l 
risk and uncertainty. With that included it seems undeniable j 
that population grovrth is a very important factor for expansioJ l 
J! 
13. J.A.Schumpeter, ££.cit., p.113 1 
I 
I 
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CHJI.PTER Vll THE THEORY OF OPTIMUl'-1 POPULATION 
If we were to accept the population theory of stagna-
tion the logical conclusion seems that the United S'bates needs 
another population boom as she has had one hundred years ago. 
Clearly it is not the case. The stagnationist never advocated 
such a policy and they even do not thinK the United States is, 
at the present time, underdeveloped in the sense of human re-
sources. But, if so, what popuJ.ation d'.h.ey w~uld think best and 11 
"-' '-' ' '- / c! -; /.t) ·;.;. ,) 
how to reconcile their theory. To answer this we are forced to 
A 
go into the old puzzl.ing problem, the theory of optimum popu-
lation. 
This theory has had a very long history; but it still 
remains an ungrasped truism as vague as many other optimum 
concepts. It is a quantitative theory but it has never been 
effectively put on a quantitative base. It is similar to a 
moving target the accurate location of which deems to be a very 
difficult art. However, as 'airchild said, "common sense and 
logic are just as useful implements for human improvement as 
1 
mathematical and statistical treatment. 11 ~v e have no reason to 
Cambridge School Theory of OPtimum Population. 
1 Fainchild in Proceedings of the World Population 
Conference, Geneva. 1927. See also J.Issac, Economics£! 
Migration. p.75 
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Briefly, this theory assumes that .the states ai1e arti-
ficial entities; they have no natural rights nor do they as 
such prosper or suffer. The end of any state policy can only 
be to secure for its individual members a maximum amount of 
2 
welfare. By this assumption it is therefore "not the aggregate 
jl 
j; 
I but the ave~age real 
3 
income per-head with which v.Je are concern-
' 
ed," and the size of population is at an optimum when it can 
provide the greatest real income of commodities and services 
per head. In terms of the marginal productivity the~ry; the 
optimum point for a population with a given amount of capital 
'I -
I 
I 
I 
and natural resources is reached under condition of free compe-
tition when the marginal ~reduct of labor is equal to the 11 
average product per head. Graphica:lly, it is the point odr inte~L 
section of the marginal product and the average product curve. 
'{ 
m4.19;/YP..I !JrtX/aci"'. 
0 ~----~-:--..---.-.-----1. pop ... ~ \Ol'\ 
The underlying principle of this theory is obviously the 
principle of return. Upon this principle, the Bureau of the 
Census, in its discussion .of optimum population, concluded 
.. 
cr. 
that "the concensus ··opinion seems to agree that the population 
of the United States is above economic optimum at least severa]l 
/i 
Policy, 
2 Ibid.,p.71 I 
3 Loc. cit., 
4 J.E.Meade,An Introduction to Economic Analysis and 
New York. 193S. p.287 
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millions for many years because the case of diminishing return 
in many fields of agriculture, mining and forestry where popu-
lation are l a r ge is apparently out-balanced by the ga in that 
would be f ostered from the incre?-sing return in the fields of 
manufa cture, transpoi1tation and many other services where popu-li 
5 
lation is comparatively small". 
This statement of the Bureau of the Census seems perfec~ 
right so long as we adopt the so-called Cambridge School theory 
of optimum population and cast no doubt on their computation. 
But, a.s oy.r problem is to deal with the theory <?f stagnation 
which is different from the traditional the ory 
a ccept t his conclusion without qualifications. 
'\'le can not 
First let us see what are the differences between the 
emphasis of the traditional and the sta gnation theory of popu- 1 
l ation: 
1. The emphasis of full employment and total national 
income by the stagnation theory shows that they do not think 
the state is an artificial entity. Consequently, the equaliza-
tion of marginal product and the average product is no longer 
the optimum point. 
2. The stagnation theory emphasizes the change of popu~l 
6 
l ation not the size of population • This emphasis is more real-l! 
istic because, aside from international migration, it is obvious 
that no immediate changes in marginal productivity can be ex-
5 G. Myrdal, Population, p.l5 and Issac, ££·£11~,p .61 
6 ill9:· ,p.62 
pected from change in number as a consequence of fall or rise 
in the birth rate since a time lag of about fourteen years has 
to be taken into account before the newly born babies have 
7 
reached working age. Also even the size of the population is 
considered too large, sudden reduction will lead back to the 
optimum point and most probably makes the conditions \'lorse 
I 
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11 
I 
because it is presumably during its change that the economy 
feels its impact. Therefore the second approach to optimum 
should be the change of the absolute rate instead of the change;, 
of total population. 
From the above differences the optimum population 
should be a rate of change of )()population which, 1n conjunction:[ 
with the change in natural resources and change of tecl).nologi- I! 
cal invention or assuming it constant, bring the population 
to a level which give full employment and maximum national 
product. Graphically, the optimum point is not necessarily the 
point \'There the average product curve meets the marginal pro-
duct curve. It rather aimed at the maximum point in the total y 
product curve. 
0 P"tsH /e;;,f/(1)-1 ~ X. 
In the above figure, the traditional optimum point is 
01 while the point sho-y;s highest national product is Oz. • This 
point is clearly above the point where the Bureau of Census 
thought adequate. 
II 
II 
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*.o..nother important factor should be considered along wi tbl 
the optimum population is the condition of the business cycle. :1 
During the depression, there is a large amount of unemployment~: 
'I 
and both the national income and the average real income tend 'I 
!I 
to be lower than it should be. Suppose large population growth [I 
can stimulate business and eliminate this unemployment then, ., 
in every depression phase, population will below optimum. This 
certainly is absurd. Therefore, whether or not the population I 
I 
is optimum over time depends on whether the full employment II 
population of one prosperity gives larger or smaller real in- ~~ 
come (national) than the other prosperity. If the later is lm-r-
er the population is above optimum. Steps, then, should be t aken 
to reduce the population. However, as being said above, the 
~eduction of population might not achieve the result wanted 
i! 
I 
!I II I, 
,, 
II 
and it is the reason why Keynes said that stationary popula tionj 
will make the improvement of the standard of living easier so 
long as we can increase consumption. 
II 
II 
II 
I· 
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CHAPTER Vlll CONCLUSION 
I 
II 
Ten years had been passed since Professor Hansen first 1 
I 
II 
I raised his theory of economic stagnation. During these ten 
1 years cmntroversies among economists had been uninterruptly 
1
j carried on. At the present time, we can neither say that this 
j theory is well established nor that it has been discredited. 1 
~ ....... II It likew the -other long run theory, for instance Marx• theory,-- ! 
contains in itself a lot of predictions which only time can 
I 
I 
i 
i 
tell with perfect correctness. Before its realization arguments !· 
have to be conceptual and, therefore, it is almost impossible 
' to prove or disprove with a gegree of certainty. 
However, theoretical analysis can give us faith or 
doubt on any prophecies and sometimes this faith or doubt may , 
in its turn, affect the prophecies. Upon this conviction, we 
believe that there is a need of further consideration on the 
stagnation theory. It should not be put as a dead issue simply 
J because some of its predictions have not been realized or can 
[ not be realized in the near future. 
I I • 
j The theory of economic stagnation is composed by the 
Keynes' theory of consumption and Hansen's theory of vanishing 
investment opportunities. There is no do~bt that Keynes' theory I 
\ had received wide acceptance. The reason that many of them do il 
l1 not accept stagnation theory must, therefore,~due to their 
I 
I dissatisfaction toward the theory of vanishing investment oppor 
tunities. 
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At the present moment, the assumption of declining popu-
lation growth and the disappearance of capital consuming inven-
tions are not existing. Even the assumption of lost frontier 
is doubtful because migration toward west and southwest has been 
continuing. It is quite natural that people would think that the 
thirties was simply a 'disappointing juglar~ than a beginning 
of economic stagnation. 
Our contention is that this is not enough to deny the 
1
stagnation theory itself nor its population aspect to which 
this p~per is discussing. 
I 
Stagnation theory is a long run secular theory. Therefor~ 
so lonS:~here is a possibility of ultimate vanishing of invest-
ment opportunities or its temporary emergence(as the decline 
of population growth in the 20 year period from 1925 to 1945) 
I state of stagnation is always a threat. This is so because,in 
a free enterprise economy, the in!ative expansion of business 
caused by the favourable enviromental factors is as determining 
as the passive adaptation to the increase of comsumptions if 
not more important. With some reservations we might even say 
that the increase of consumption is determined by the former. 
Population increas~ certainly stimulate business expan-
sion. ~here are ample historical proofs so that nobody ever 
tried to argue with it. But, history never witnessed great de-
cline of population~ This made people hesitate to accept the 
stagnationist's explanation. 
Our findings are that the declining population growth 
88 
(often accompanied by a rising social income) and the ultimate 
condition of stationary population or depopulation will in-
, crease saving, reduce the expenditures on capital consuming 
goode and discourage the business• iniative of expansion. It 
is as discouraging to business activity as the increasing popu-
lation is encouraging business. 
However, we do not mean that the population should be 
increased( indefinitely. Without expanding frontier and techno-
logical inventions, population increase can not always be an 
investment opportunity. There should be a limit to it. Basad 
on the stagnation theory we think the limit is not the tradi-
tional optimum where marginal product equals to the average 
product. It is the population whmYh will give maximum national 
product and employment. In thllie sense the United States is not il 
I 
I . 
' 
overpopulated because the real national product under full-
employment had been continually increasing. 
-----end-----
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
The fundamental backgrounds of this thesis are the 
severe depression and weak recovery of the thirties and the 
trend of declining population growth since 1925. The stagnation 
theory relates these economic and demogrphical phenomenon in 
the -v;ay that the fundamental cause of the trend of the secular 
under-employment fluctuation is the increasing proportion of 
total saving and the vanishing of investment opportunities 
among which declining population gro\'lth is_ almost the most 
important one. 
This thesis aims at the investigation of whether and 
how the decline of population gro\~h affects the business 
activities and precipitates the under-employment condition as 
the stagnationists stated. 
Throughout the study, decline of population growth 
means the decline of the annual increment of population. This 
annual increment as well as the total population at any time 
consists of three different groups of people: the dependant 
group, young and old, and the working age group. When popula-
tion growth declines the age composition will be correspond-
ingly shifted. The young people group will be smaller, the 
working age group will increase slowly and the old aged group 
will be larger. 
The continueous decline of population growth is un-
favourable to the business' expectation of profit and, therefor~, 
discourag~investment. Some businesses like public utilities 
i 
ii 
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residential and railroad construction depend primirily upon tha i 
increase of population. The shift of age composition will, aa 
a whole, and especially under the condition of rising social 
d 
income, decrease the demands for necessities like food, clothin~ 
and housing which require more capital per worker or per unit 
of product and increase the demands for luxuries like personal 
services and fashionable goods which not only require less: 
capital per worker but also increase the risk and uncertainty 
!: 
of the business. At the same time savings will also be increasea 
which makes the task of maintaining full employment more 
difficult. 
All these are long run secular effects. In the short 
run, these effects are not easy to perceive. However, even 
i 
we can not attribute the cause of business cycle to population li 
: j 
change, we can see that the decline of population growth tends I 
to shorten the period of prosperity and deepening the period 
of depression. 
Chapter on the theoretical controversies throws light 
on the fact that the predictions of the stagnationists are not 
well founded although their theoretical analysis seems sound. 
The anti-stagnationists have good reasons to doubt the predic-
tions but their theoretieal argument are very unsystematical. 
The last chapter on optimum population was touched by 
the stagnationists nor by the anti-stagnationists. It was dis- , 
rl 
cussed because it was implied in their arguments. As a whole, 
the stagnationist emphasized the maximization of national 
' ====-~=== 
product while the ant1-stagnation1sts emphsized the maximiza-
tion of per capita income. Consequently, in most cases, the 
optimum population of the stagnationists is larger. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I . 
I' 
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